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ABSTRACT 
 
 
REALIZING AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL IN LAND REFORM: THE 
CASE OF VAALHARTS IRRIGATION SCHEME IN THE NORTHERN 
CAPE PROVINCE 
 
Ramatsimele Jacqueline Maisela    M. Phil Mini-Thesis 
 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, University 
of the Western Cape 
 
 
The effectiveness of the South African land reform programme has been at the centre 
of debates among land reform activists and within government. Empirical evidence 
shows that land reform has not only been moving at a slow pace, but has also had 
limited impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries, due to the fact that many land 
reform farms have operated at a very low level since being transferred to their new 
owners. This study looks at the performance of land reform in South Africa, using the 
Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme in the Northern Cape as an example. The overall 
objective of the study was to identify factors contributing to the success or failure of 
agricultural production on land reform projects (farms) and to make recommendations 
as to how productivity could be improved. It focused on the eight redistributed farms 
in the Vaalharts Scheme, measuring 378 hectares in total, which were transferred 
between 1995 and 2006. The study used both primary and secondary data (in the form 
of structured interviews, focused discussions, and official reports), and includes a 
review of literature on land reform in South Africa and internationally. 
 
The findings of the study show that production on the redistributed land at the 
Vaalharts Scheme is at a very low level compared to other farms in the areas, and that 
113 of 378 ha, or 30% of the land, has never been planted since transfer. Factors 
contributing to this include lack of money for production inputs and limited 
knowledge and skill on the part of farmers.  
 
This was evident in all cases where production was taking place, as recommended 
levels of inputs were not being followed, resulting in low outputs. Evidence from the 
study also shows that poor performance of projects can be attributed to the way these 
projects were designed and implemented. Many projects have big numbers of 
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beneficiaries, but their business plans fail to address how production will be organized 
within the group, or how benefits will be distributed. Post-transfer support to 
beneficiaries has been absent or minimal in most cases. 
 
Overall, land reform projects at Vaalharts are making little contribution towards the 
livelihoods of the intended beneficiaries. It is for this reason that the majority of 
members have lost interest and stayed away from the new farms, as their expectations 
could not be met in terms of income and other livelihood expectations. The 
expectations of the state that these new farmers will contribute to the mainstream 
agricultural economy are also not being met. The study concludes that without 
immediate and comprehensive interventions the objectives of transforming the 
agriculture sector and improving rural livelihoods through land reform are unlikely to 
be realised, thus maintaining the apartheid status quo of a dualistic agricultural sector 
and perpetuating rural poverty.  
 
 
May 2007
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Context of the study 
 
For generations access to land, opportunity and growth has been based on race in 
South Africa. Over the past one hundred years the land policy in South Africa actively 
supported the emergence of white commercial agriculture and capitalist profiteering. 
Among the measures used to achieve this was the elimination of independent African 
production and the restriction of their access to land to small communal reserves 
designated solely for African occupation. This resulted in black people being 
restricted only to subsistence farming and on lands to which they could not have 
ownership. The situation was further exacerbated by the passing of the Land Act of 
1913, which saw many black South Africans forcibly removed from certain areas of 
origin, particularly from prime agricultural lands which were intended for 
developments to benefit white South Africans only.   
While acting as reservoirs of cheap and largely male labour, these communal areas 
were also ‘dumping grounds’ for those people (the elderly, women and children) 
deemed surplus to the labour needs of the white economy (Molefe, 2004). The 
resolution of the land question in favour of white capital was thus central to the 
making of contemporary South Africa. 
 
South African agriculture has been built on particular natural resource bases, one of 
which is land, and with a systematically enforced racial division. This skewed 
distribution of land and other resources has given effect to the current agricultural 
sector in the country, which is dualistic. As noted by Deininger and May (2000) the 
South African agricultural sector comprises of two sectors. There are millions of the 
poor who rely on scarce natural resources, complemented by remittances and pensions 
from outside as part of a survival strategy, and then there is a small number of the 
privileged with an abundance of natural resources which is used to produce increasing 
surpluses on the white commercial farms.  
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Andrew et al (2003) refer to the dualistic nature of South African agriculture, stating 
that commercial farming is mainly on privately owned land and subsistence farming 
mainly in communal areas and further dismisses historical stereotype perceptions that 
subsistence uses of land have been wasteful and economically unproductive in 
comparison with commercial production systems. Redressing the imbalances in land 
distribution has thus been a crucial precondition for the legitimacy of the new 
democratic order. The challenge faced therefore is finding the best ways and means to 
achieve overall economic growth and reduction in the level of poverty and food 
insecurity, particularly at the household level (Makhanya, 2002). 
 
Land reform is viewed by many as one of the key policies that can lead towards 
correcting the past injustices, increasing access and participation in the mainstream 
agricultural economy by the previously marginalised South Africans and addressing 
the problem of poverty and food insecurity in rural areas. As cited in Hall (2004) land 
reform further performs an important symbolic function in the new South Africa as 
tangible evidence of a nation addressing historical injustice as part of a wider process 
of nation-building. For Cousins (2004) access to land and resources for most of those 
involved in the land reform is not sufficient. Access to inputs, markets and marketing 
support, extension and training is also necessary. 
 
1.2.  Problem statement 
 
The South African land reform programme was introduced in 1994 as part of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The programme rested on three 
principal sub-programmes, namely, restitution, redistribution and tenure reform. Land 
restitution aims to restore the land rights lost due to racially discriminatory laws 
passed during the apartheid era. Land redistribution aims to provide the previously 
disadvantaged South Africans access to land for residential and productive purposes. 
Tenure Reform seeks to provide the security of tenure to people occupying land 
lawfully (Department of Land Affairs, 1997).  
 
These three main sub-programmes, according to Deininger and May (2000), are 
complementary parts of a comprehensive approach to deal with the legacy of 
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apartheid and at the same time establish the basis for development of a diverse rural 
sector in South Africa.   
 
Poverty is strongly linked to rural areas. Rural areas account for about 75% of South 
Africa’s poor (Thwala 2003). Land reform should therefore form a significant part of 
redistributing assets and alleviating poverty.  
 
Land reform in South Africa coincided with policy shifts in agriculture, amongst 
others the removal of direct government support, which was in the form of soft loans, 
tax breaks, single channel marketing and the state-supported co-operatives.  The 
dismantling of trade barriers also saw the South African markets opening up to global 
competition (Hall, 2004).  This was viewed by many - especially land reform 
beneficiaries and the new black entrants into farming who aspired to enter commercial 
farming - as a hindrance to participation in the sector, to which access had been 
denied for centuries. The new reforms meant access to those resources that were 
previously reserved for whites. On the white commercial side, the result of 
deregulation and liberalisation was, according to Hall (2004), a rise in the rate of 
bankruptcies and the consolidation of land holdings into fewer hands.    
  
While there is consensus that there is a demand for land from the historically 
disadvantaged groupings, there are disagreements among role players as to how land 
should be managed and utilised once it has been transferred.  Some studies suggest 
that the land reform programme is not leading to an improvement in agricultural 
production and income and many land reform beneficiaries are threatened with 
insolvency (Orthmann & Machethe, 2003). Many resettled areas are experiencing 
declining agricultural productivity and in situations where production has been 
realised by new farmers, lack of access to markets has forced them into extremely 
exploitative exchange arrangements which further erode their welfare and drive them 
into poverty (Van Schalkwyk et al, 2003). It is further argued by Monama (2006) that 
some of South Africa’s vital contributors to food security and significant earners of 
foreign currency have withered and even collapsed since being transferred to 
beneficiaries of land reform.  
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The Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs (2005) concedes that while 
considerable institutional energy and funds have been expended on providing access 
to land for new entrants into farming over the past years, minimal efforts have been 
made with regard to the support that should see the redistributed farms coming into 
production, which is also sustainable.   
 
This study examines the agricultural potential of land reform in South Africa, using as 
an example the case of the Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme in the Northern Cape 
Province.   
 
The Vaalharts Scheme, as it is commonly known, was established in 1934 with the 
aim of supporting poor white people. The scheme comprises approximately 32 000ha 
of prime agricultural land, and is, according to Claasen (1989), the largest irrigation 
scheme in Southern Africa. 
 
Land reform in Vaalharts has thus far been achieved entirely through the 
redistribution programme. The restitution claim has been lodged on the entire 
Vaalharts scheme by Chief Mankurwane on behalf of Mothibi community, but this is 
still at the research stage. If successful, it will obviously have interesting outcomes, 
which could be determined through further research.  
 
The study will focus only on the redistributed land in the scheme. The land 
redistribution programme in the Vaalharts Settlement dates back to 1995, with the 
purchase of Silverdale farm through the Settlement and Land acquisition Grant 
(SLAG), a component of the land reform programme of the new Government after 
1994. SLAG was later replaced by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) programme, which saw the redistribution of more land in the 
Vaalharts Scheme. There is a widespread belief that production on some of the 
redistributed farms/land has declined or is non-existent, but the reasons for this are not 
well understood. 
 
In Vaalharts, 378 hectares (about 1.08% of the 32 000 hectares scheme) has been 
redistributed to date. Almost half of it is currently not in production (Department of 
Agriculture and Land Reform, 2006). In terms of agriculture’s contribution to the 
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GDP and employment this has a negative bearing on beneficiaries’ livelihoods, the 
economy of the area and of the entire province.  
 
This study looked at factors constraining the realisation of optimal farm production 
and the reasons for declining production. This study will suggest possible ways and 
means of streamlining support interventions that are available to farmers. It also 
provides a basis for further comprehensive investigations of the potential of the 
Vaalharts Irrigations Scheme. This could inform future land reform projects and 
contribute towards the success and sustainability of similar projects which could be 
extended to other parts of the country.   
 
1.3. Objectives of the study 
 
The study was intended to explore the challenges facing the South African land 
reform programme and the factors that contribute to the success or failure of 
agricultural production on land reform projects. This was done through a review of 
the emerging literature on land reform in the country (including grey literature) and a 
detailed case study of the Vaalharts Scheme.  
 
Specific objectives of the case study are: 
- To understand current land use on the redistributed farms 
- To understand the factors that constrain new farmers from realising optimum 
production  
- To assess the effectiveness of the existing post-transfer support interventions 
- To suggest ways in which the land reform process could be improved in order to 
deliver more land and improve the productivity of new farmers. 
 
1.4. Research questions 
 
More specifically, the research attempted to answer the following questions: 
 
- How much land was transferred and to how many beneficiaries? 
- How much land is under production? 
- What crops are farmers producing and what influences their choice?  
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- What may be the reasons for low (or no) production and what are the 
limitations to greater achievements? 
- What type and level of support is available to new land owners, and how do 
farmers themselves rate this support? 
 
1.5. Research design 
 
1.5.1. Scope of research 
 
The study was conducted in the Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme in Phokwane Local 
Municipality in Northern Cape. It focused on the plots that have been transferred to 
emerging farmers through the land redistribution sub-programme under group 
ownership. Views from commercial farmers, NGOs and agribusiness operating in the 
area were solicited in order to establish another view point of land reform in the 
Vaalharts scheme.  
 
1.5.2. Rationale for the choice of the study area 
 
The rationale for the choice of study area is that Vaalharts is regarded as the bread 
basket of the Northern Cape Province and, according to the Department of Agriculture 
(2006), the area produces some of the country’s finest quality agricultural products, 
such as cotton and wheat. The area also has high potential for agri-tourism because of 
its scenery. Land reform in Vaalharts should therefore serve as one of the vehicles 
through which previously disadvantaged black farmers and would-be farmers could 
have access to and participate in the mainstream agriculture.  
 
The study therefore aims to suggests strategies and approaches that could be 
employed to ensure that post-transition processes are such that the land is used 
productively, thereby creating livelihoods and enabling new owners to become 
effective participants in the mainstream agricultural economy 
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1.5.3. Research methods 
 
The study relied on both qualitative and quantitative research methods, using primary 
and secondary data. The methods used are outlined hereunder. Interviews with 
farmers who were beneficiaries of the eight land reform projects in the Vaalharts were 
conducted using a questionnaire developed for information gathering purposes. 
Respondents were also allowed to express their opinions, which exposed issues not 
necessarily covered in the questionnaire. Additional information was gathered during 
meetings with white commercial farmer from interactions with officials of the 
Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA) and Northern Cape Provincial Land 
Reform Office (NCPLRO), from documentary reports from these two institutions and 
from focussed discussions with agricultural co-operatives and financial institutions 
active in the Vaalharts areas and from various internet sites.  
The study relied on both qualitative and quantitative research methods, using primary 
and secondary data. Information for the survey was obtained from the following 
sources: 
• Interviews with farmers who were beneficiaries of the eight land reform projects 
in the Vaalharts using a questionnaire developed for information gathering 
purposes. Respondents were also allowed to express their opinions, thus exposing 
issues not necessarily covered in the questionnaire. 
• during meetings with white commercial farmers 
• interactions with officials of the Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA) and 
Northern Cape Provincial Land Reform Office (NCPLRO), 
• from documentary reports from PDA and NCPLRO  
• from focussed discussions with agricultural co-operatives and financial 
institutions active in the Vaalharts areas  
• and from various internet sites.  
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The box below indicates each research question and the methods associated with it.  
Research Question Data Collection Method 
How much land was transferred and to 
how many people/beneficiaries 
- Data from reports – Department of Land 
(DLA) and Provincial Department of 
Agriculture (PDA) 
How much land is under production and 
at what intensity? 
- Structured interviews with new farmers 
- Data from PDA  
What crops are farmers producing, and 
what influences their choice?  
 
- Structured interviews with new farmers 
- Observations 
- Focused discussions with officials of 
PDA  
- Focused discussions with and reports 
from financial institutions (Banks) 
What are reasons for low/no production 
and what are limitations to greater 
achievements? 
 
- Structured interview with farmers 
- Focused discussions with officials of 
PDA and DLA 
- Reports from PDA and DLA 
 
What type and the level of support is 
available to new land owners, and how 
do farmers themselves rate this support? 
 
- Structured interview with farmers 
- Focused discussions with NGOs, 
Financial Institutions and Agricultural 
Co-operatives 
- Reports from PDA 
- Internet sites
 
1.6. Thesis outline 
 
The context, problem statement and objectives of the study are discussed in the first 
chapter. Discussed also in chapter one is how the research was designed, outlining the 
scope of research and reasons why the study area was chosen as well as research 
methods employed to gather data. 
 
Chapter two provides an overview of land reform and debates around farmer 
settlement looking firstly at international and African experiences, and then at South 
African perspectives.  
 
The third chapter is an overview of agriculture in the Northern Cape Province, 
including production trends and the current and future prospects. The chapter in 
addition gives a description of the study area and the redistributed plots under 
investigation, highlighting key physical characteristics such climate and soils.  
 
Chapter four presents the detailed research findings and analysis, while chapter five 
presents the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LAND REFORM OVERVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
An overview of land reform and debates around farmer settlement is given in this 
chapter. The views of various land reform scholars and activists are discussed, 
providing both international and African experiences. The South African land reform 
programme is also discussed. The literature shows that land reform alone will not 
achieve rural development or poverty alleviation, but must be combined with other 
agrarian reforms, such as access to capital, training and markets. 
 
Land reform has throughout the world occurred under varying circumstances and for 
various reasons. Griffin et al (2002:317) attest that in Mexico, Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Cuba, Russia in 1917 and China in 1949, major land reforms occurred as part of a 
social revolution. In Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, eastern and central Europe after 
1945 they were an outcome of war and military occupation. In many parts of Africa 
reforms occurred as part of the process of liberation from the colonial power.   
 
During the period immediately after independence (1940s to early 1980s), according 
to El-Ghonemy (2001), state-led redistributive land reform was a priority for many 
developing countries. Land reform has been at the heart of efforts to promote rural 
development and a response to the abject poverty, gross inequalities and social 
instability, especially in much of the world after the Second World War and in the 
post-colonial states of Asia and Africa. Although reform programmes in different 
countries had a different scope, pace and nature, the broader aim was to reduce 
poverty and inequalities, combined with emancipating the peasants from the former 
political power of landlords and their monopolies in the labour markets. 
 
The late 1980s saw a shift away from government-implemented redistributive land 
reform towards reliance on the formal credit market and on landed property transfers 
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that are freely negotiated in an open market. This is referred to as market-led land 
reform (El-Ghonemy 2001).  
 
State-led land reforms were redistribution programmes in which the government was 
the sole player. Such programmes were mainly characterised by both socialism and 
nationalism. Land reform programmes were mainly confiscatory, top-down and 
involved redistribution from big landlords to poorer peasants and the landless, either 
in the form of collectivisation or nationalisation. The decision and powers in terms of 
when and how land redistribution should be implemented rested solely with the state, 
which also had control over land use, production means and markets.   
 
This style of land reform had been criticised by the proponents of market-led land 
reform as inefficient and leading to increased rural poverty. Dorner & Thiesenhusen 
(1990: 65-72) reflects some weaknesses of the state-led redistribution programme, 
citing China experiences of collectivisation method of land reform. Further reflections 
are on Latin America and the Soviet Bloc, in which the failures are attributed to state 
inefficiencies and markets distortion.   
 
Market-based land reform was thus viewed as part of a strategy for agricultural 
liberalisation and rural development. Bernstein (2002: 447) relates this to the rise of 
neo-liberal thinking that emphasises the need for land titling for provision of security 
of tenure to producers to encourage investments and to foster efficient land markets in 
order to make it easier for land to be purchased and sold.  
 
For its proponents, market-based land reform goes beyond land redistribution through 
the market to include other agrarian reforms such as access to credit, markets, 
production inputs, technical and extension support. Market-based land reform also 
promotes land titling, in the belief that private ownership is a prerequisite for 
investment and development, but this view is challenged by various scholars who 
argue that the supposed links between private property and investment are far from 
conclusive. For example, Migot-Adholla et al (1993) argue that in Kenya, Ghana and 
Rwanda people were more inclined to invest in their land if their user rights could be 
handed down to their children, than if user-rights could not be transferred. 
Furthermore, Ellsworth (2002) argues that gains in productivity in China occurred 
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when the country went communist and collectivised its assets, a fact that suggests that 
it might have been the size and acceptance of the institutional change that influenced 
such productivity gains, and not necessarily ownership. According to Riedinger et al 
(2001) the 1990s brought a new wave of agrarian reform in countries in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and the states of former Soviet Union, which also involved a move 
from the traditional to a market-based land reform, an approach advocated by the 
World Bank amongst others. The Bank describes market-based approach as 
“voluntary land transfers based on the negotiation between willing buyers and willing 
sellers’’ (Deininger & Biswanger, 1999). 
 
Market-based land reform increasingly became the dominant policy approach of 
developing countries and was associated with the introduction of economic reform 
policies or structural adjustment packages by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, over which the developing country governments had little or no 
control according to Tait (2003).  
 
The developing countries were “faced with stark realities of large financial shortages 
and deficits that were normally filled in the form of loans and aid from foreign 
countries and development agencies, developing countries were more or less obliged 
to accept the conditions and policy frameworks of those that had the willingness and 
ability to support their development” (Tait, 2003: 5) 
 
In the South African context the implication of voluntary land transfer has been that 
land owners decides when to sell, what land to sell and at what price (which is loosely 
determined by the market). The role of central government is arguably reduced to the 
provision of land purchase grants or loans to eligible beneficiaries. Potential 
beneficiaries are expected to take the initiative, e.g. negotiate the purchase price with 
the seller, and arrange for credit to finance the land and capital requirement. The 
ability to pay back the loan is often not considered, which has led to many land reform 
farms being repossessed or auctioned by the banks.  
 
Critics of market-based land reform argue that the approach has not been effective in 
terms of expediting change in land ownership, but has instead delayed land 
redistribution and has failed to address rural inequality in all countries that adopted 
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this approach. Some scholars argue that there is no evidence yet that has shown a 
successful land reform programme that is market-based, as compared to the old state-
led redistribution programme (see Lahiff, 2006 and Rosset, 2001). Riedinger (2001) 
also states cases of success of land reform in Mexico, the former Soviet Union, China, 
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, which were state-led and compulsory. In the South 
African context the “willing seller-willing buyer” (WSWB) approach has arguably 
given land owners excessive power in the land reform process in that they have the 
right to decide as to when and to whom to sell the land. Lahiff (2005) has argued that 
the landless and the state have no guarantees on whether they will get the land they 
want.  
 
For South Africa, the problems with market-led reform, according to Lahiff (2006), 
include “the reluctance of land owners to respond favourably to market inducements; 
tendency to push land prices up; exclusion of poorer beneficiaries; inappropriate farm 
planning (leading to project failures) and the failure of private sector agencies to 
effectively replace state agricultural services”.  
 
2.2.  International experiences 
 
In the 1940s and 1950s, land reform in countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea followed a policy of ‘’land to tiller’’ and distributed land ownership rights 
among households in a highly egalitarian manner (Griffin et al 2002: 303). In Taiwan 
land reform was introduced between 1949 and 1954, and had three distinct phases, 
namely rent reduction, the sale of public land and the land-to-the-tiller programme 
(Dorner & Thiesenhusen, 1990:74). The purchase of tenanted land by government 
was compulsory from those who had land in excess of a specified amount. The ceiling 
was set very low and the price paid by government was below the market price. Land 
was then redistributed among tenants and landless households at a low price and 
payments were financed by credit granted by government. Land reform was 
completed by measures that were intended to stimulate agricultural growth while 
improving the distribution of income. According to Griffin et al (2002:303) such 
measures included investment in rural infrastructure, the use of price incentives to 
encourage a shift in production away from rice to higher value crops and government-
sponsored research in plant breeding and agronomy. For Griffin et al (2002: 305) 
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these interventions yielded positive results in that poverty declined and agriculture 
growth accelerated: pure tenancy reduced to 17% of farm households, 48% of farm 
households received land, total production grew by 5% a year and crop output per 
worker grew by 3% a year between 1953 and 1964.  
 
Land reform in these Asian countries was viewed to be successful, which has been 
attributed to the factors such as the adoption of low ceiling of land ownership which 
implied that more people acquired land; the alignment of land redistribution with the 
necessary support measures for production; and strong civil organisations at local 
level.  
These organisations advocated the rights of peasants and played a critical role in 
monitoring transactions, thus minimising fraudulent and corrupt actions. 
 
 From the mid-1990s, countries such as Brazil, Columbia, and the Philippines adopted 
the market-based approach to land reform. Notably, market-based approach had not 
yielded positive results in some of these countries. For instance, in Colombia the 
failure was attributed to among others, high land prices, backed also by cumbersome 
government bureaucracies, resulting in delays in land transactions and transfers. In the 
Philippines, lack of honesty1 and resistance on the part of landowners as well as 
inadequate funding resulted in many delays in land redistribution (Riedinger, et al, 
2000). Rosset (2001)’s argument is that market-led redistribution favoured land 
owners because they had a choice as to which land they could sell and often chose to 
sell mainly marginal and economically fragile plots, many of which were not in 
production and at exorbitant prices. In most instances, this resulted in the inability to 
make the redistributed land “farmable”. Adams (2000:19) holds the same view, 
arguing that although the state offered grants to the poor to acquire land, the increased 
demand pushed up land prices, making land still unaffordable to the majority of the 
targeted beneficiaries.  
 
The change of government in Brazil in 1995 placed land reform high on the 
government’s agenda, with social movements also exerting pressure for land delivery. 
Some of the policy interventions included an increase in land reform budget (from 
                                                 
1 Land owners selling low-quality land, which was also overvalued, Riedinger, et al (2000) 
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US$0.4B in 1994 to US$2.6B in 1997) and the improvement of the legal and 
administrative framework for the federal expropriation program (Peixoto 2005). The 
World Bank-supported negotiated land reform pilot project was also extended 
nationwide, making land reform an integral part of National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy of government.  According to Barros et al (2003) land reform in Brazil 
entailed two main redistribution programmes, namely the market-assisted or land 
credit programme, which involves voluntary agreement between land owners and 
beneficiary association, with the state involvement and has support from the National 
Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG); and the federal programme, 
which is based on expropriation and supported by the Landless People Movement 
(MST).  
 
The recognition by Government of the two social movements as partners in the 
implementation of the land reform pilot project nationwide was related to the claimed 
success of the market-based land reform (Borras, 2003). Analysts however suggest 
that land reform in Brazil still faced many challenges, among others, land owners 
contested the listing of farms for expropriation and land valuations, thus raising land 
expropriation costs significantly. Landlords sold low-quality land, and complex 
administrative and legal procedures made land transactions cumbersome (Borras, 
2003). Further arguments are centred on the inefficiencies of post settlement 
programmes and the ability of the resettled farmers to make a living out of the land. 
According to de Janvry & Sadoulet (2002) most families, because of absence of 
support, do not harvest enough to feed their households and are unable to pay back the 
loans. 
  
Market-based land reform in Columbia was marked by similar challenges, which saw 
a limited success of the programme. Amongst other limitations were high prices as a 
result of coercion from landowners, the refusal of intended beneficiaries to purchase 
and high transaction costs which prohibited small peasants from participating in land 
transactions (Deininger, 1999). This had thus resulted in a low rate of land transfers. 
 
In the case of the Philippines, Borras (2006) argues that the claimed achievements 
were as a result of poor and in some instances, deliberate flawed reporting on the part 
of state: for instances the listing of cases where land exchange hands between families 
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and cases of ‘lease-back’ arrangements, which according to Borras lack the real 
element of redistributive reform. Landlords would sell the land at a very low price, 
with the intention of leasing it back for longer periods at lower rental and worker-
beneficiaries would remain as workers. The lease period is so long that most 
beneficiaries would have died without ever owning the land they were supposed to 
have obtained through land reform.    
 
2.3. Land reform experiences in Africa 
 
As in other part of the developing world, rapid population growth, environmental 
degradation and the slow rate of economic development in many parts of Africa have 
left many people dependent on small-scale farming. This has resulted in increasing 
competition and contest over land. Coupled with this were the effects of social, 
political and environmental crises, which emanated from inappropriate development 
policies and, in some instances, wars. This had, according to Zulu (1993), put pressure 
on governments to transform land ownership structures to reflect democratic 
principles of equitable access and to redress the histories of dispossession and 
exclusion suffered during the colonial period.  
 
Land reform has been regarded as a key part of national development strategies, 
aimed at reducing rural inequality, improving agricultural productivity and food 
security and increasing incomes and overall welfare of the rural population. The 
approach and motivation for land reform has, however, varied from country to 
country and over time. 
 
Kenya’s market-based land reform in the 1960 entailed the privatisation of customary 
land, consolidation of fragmented holdings and the promotion of land-title transfers 
through the market (Konyimbih, 2002). This approach followed some of the 
recommendations of the Swynnerton Report of 1954, which Kenya continued to 
implement even after independence. While Kenyan land reform seemed to be 
successful, i.e. it was able to achieve 90% of the land reform target within a time 
frame of between five to ten years (Mburathi, 2005), it is worth noting that the 
reforms, coupled with reduced social spending and deteriorating living conditions of 
low-income groups (as a result of economic reforms) contributed to extreme land 
 
 
 
 
 16
concentration. Furthermore, with land titling certain groups of people, particularly 
women, pastoralists, hunter-gatherers and people belonging to minority tribes who 
have traditionally enjoyed subsidiary or derived rights, were denied legal recognition 
of their customary rights to land during the registration process (Platteau, 2000). This 
also led to increased rural poverty and loss of food security due to landlessness, 
among these groups (El-Ghonemy 2001). The positive aspect of Kenya’s land reform 
is that it was accompanied by other agrarian reforms, which opened access to and 
participation of black farmers in large scale production and markets.  A notable 
example was access by African farmers to suitable highland areas to keep dairy cattle 
and grow high-value crops such as coffee, and the expansion of tea production 
through contract farming (Williams, 1996).  
 
In Zambia, the market-based land reform followed donors’ requests to the Zambian 
government in 1995 to implement land reform legislation (the 1995 Land Act) with 
the aim of stimulating investment and agricultural productivity, and sought to change 
the 94% of Zambian land held under customary tenure2 to private tenure, or leasehold 
in some instances. This was nearly two and half decades after independence, during 
which Zambian land tenure policy had been heavily influenced by both socialism and 
nationalism (Brown, 2005).  
 
The Land Act had led to an increase in foreign investment in the Zambian agriculture 
and tourism sectors and an increase in the number of title conversions to leasehold3. 
Munanula, Muyakwa, & Munanula (2003), however, argue that the reform has 
generated economic and social exclusion in some parts of the country, with market-
based land reform viewed to have accrued to the local elite and outside investors and 
not to poor villagers. Its negative impact, particularly on the part of the rural poor, 
was largely due to the enclosures of common resources as a result of the transfer of 
customary land to leasehold. Conflicts became apparent as villagers and chiefs 
disagreed over title conversions (Brown & Siamwiza, 2002).  Inefficiencies on the 
part of government (limited human, financial and technological resources) also led to 
                                                 
2The land is owned by Government, which grants Chiefs legal authority to oversee customary lands, grant 
occupancy and use rights to the land and oversee its transfer  between subjects (Brown, 2005) 
3There has been a significant increase in the amount of land in Zambia owned by foreigners, 240 investment 
certificates were issued to large scale commercial farmers between 1995 and December 2002, Brown, 2005)   
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flawed land administration processes owing to perverse actions of government 
officials at both local and central levels, the local elite and traditional leaders.  
 
In some parts of Southern Africa, particularly the former settler colonies of Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, land reform debates were mainly influenced by colonial 
histories, with the three countries sharing a similar profile of racially skewed land 
distribution owing largely to dispossession of black rural population, which was 
confined to overcrowded communal lands. Land reform in these countries broadly 
seeks to decongest overpopulated areas; to promote equitable distribution of 
agricultural land, to de-racialise commercial agriculture; and to resettle and secure 
land tenure of the landless. There are, however, some distinctions between countries’ 
approaches and processes (Moyo, 2005). Notably, land reform in the three countries 
has been based to some degree on the land market as a mechanism for availing land 
for redistribution. Namibian and Zimbabwean experiences are debated extensively 
elsewhere, and will not be repeated in this study4.  
 
2.4. South African land reform programme 
 
In post-1994 South Africa, land reform became a significant part of the reconstruction 
and development programme of the new African National Congress (ANC) 
government. The South African land reform policy centred mainly on addressing the 
racially skewed land ownership, which emanated from the 1913 Land Act and 
subsequent legislation; reducing poverty and contributing to economic growth, 
particularly in areas that were marginalised through apartheid laws, and securing land 
and tenure rights of the marginalised people (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). As a 
result the South African land reform programme had three main elements, namely 
land redistribution, land restitution and land tenure reform.  
(a) Land Redistribution is a broad programme which aims to provide the 
disadvantaged and the poor with land for residential and productive purposes. 
The government developed a single, yet flexible, grant mechanism to 
embrace the wide variety of land needs of applicants. Land redistribution can 
take the form of individual and group settlement, and/or with production; 
                                                 
4 See Palmer (1990); Moyo (2001); Moyo (2005); Werner (1997); and Tyehimba (2006). 
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commonage schemes; or share equity schemes; 
Under the Provision of Land and Assistance Act, 126 of 1993, the DLA 
assisted eligible individuals and groups to obtain a Settlement/Land 
Acquisition Grant to a maximum of R16 000 per household for the purchase 
of land directly from willing sellers, including the state. This was followed 
by the Land Redistribution Programme (LRAD) in 2001, which according to 
the Ministry for Agriculture and Land Reform (2001) has a more commercial 
focus.  
(b) Land Restitution aims to restore land and provide other compensation to 
people dispossessed by the 1913 Land Act. This is being done in such a way 
as to support the process of reconciliation and development, and with regard 
to the over-arching consideration of fairness and justice for individuals, 
communities and the country as a whole (DLA, 1997).  
 
The government’s policy and procedure for land claims are based on the 
provisions of the Constitution5 and the Restitution of Land Rights Act, 22 of 
1994. A restitution claim qualifies for investigation by the Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights provided that the claimant was dispossessed of a 
right in land after 19 June 1913, as a result of racially discriminatory laws or 
practices, and was not paid just and equitable compensation (DLA, 1997). 
Restitution can take the form of: 
• restoration of the land from which claimants were dispossessed; 
• provision of alternative land; 
• payment of compensation; 
• alternative relief comprising a combination of the above; or 
• priority access to government housing and land development programmes. 
 
The State may compensate successful claimants where restoration of the land 
or other remedies is not appropriate. Land owners whose land is expropriated 
for the purposes of restoring land to successful claimants must be 
compensated in a just and equitable manner. 
  
                                                 
5 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996) 
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(c) Land tenure reform is to provide security of tenure. Under the new 
Constitution, the South African government was obliged to develop laws 
which set out the types of interests in land which were undermined by 
discriminatory laws and ensure that such interests in land are legally secure. 
New laws include the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 31 of 
1996 (IPILRA)6, which was used as an instrument to deal with certain 
development decisions while still awaiting the promulgation and 
implementation of Communal Lands Rights Act, 11 of 2004, the Labour 
Tenants Act, 3 of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 62 of 
1997 (ESTA).  
 
ESTA provides for tenure security in two ways: first, by helping people living on rural 
or peri-urban land to obtain stronger rights to the land on which they are living, or to 
land close by; and secondly, by laying down certain steps that owners and persons in 
charge of rural or peri-urban land must follow before they can evict people. The Act 
also regulates day-to-day relations between owners and people living on rural or peri-
urban land and it is enforced by the magistrate’s court, the Land Claims court and, in 
certain instances, the provincial High Courts (DLA, 1997). 
 
South Africa adopted a market-based approach for its land reform, focusing largely on 
the “willing seller, willing buyer” (WSWB) concept.  Although the WSWB is 
essentially not a new concept in South Africa (it was, for example, practised under the 
1975 Expropriation Act), there is a common view among land reform scholars that 
adoption of the concept had mainly to do with the World Bank’s advice to the new 
ANC government, by promoting voluntary land transfers based on negotiations 
between the willing buyer and the willing seller, see (Riedinger et al, 2000; Hall, 
2004, and Lahiff, 2006). This also came as a policy choice, a shift in economic 
thinking of the African National Congress (ANC) in line with more investor friendly 
macro-economic strategy. 
 
The concept appears to have also been influenced by the course of land reform in 
Zimbabwe in early 1990s, which is rooted in the Lancaster House Agreement of 1980 
                                                 
6 A mechanism to protect those with insecure tenure from losing their rights to, or interest in land pending long-
term reform measures (DLA, 1997) 
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(Lahiff, 2005). However, the South African concept of WSWB is distinct in that the 
state does not have power of first refusal as was the case in Zimbabwe. Thus, 
landowners can avoid offering their land for sale for land reform purposes, but still 
dispose of their land on an open market, a view shared by Molefe (2006). As the state 
does not have the power of first refusal, the intended beneficiaries have to compete for 
available land on the open market and at a market price.  
 
The WSWB principle in South Africa means that land redistribution is based on 
willing seller, willing buyer arrangements, with government’s role limited to assisting 
the poor with grants to acquire land, including financial support for planning 
processes. The process implies that people interested in buying land search for the 
land that is on the market and negotiate the sale with the owner or the agent, then 
approach the Department of Land Affairs with an offer to sell from the land owner, at 
a price determined by the seller, based on the current market price to apply for grants. 
The Department of Land Affairs would then take the process from that point and 
institute further processes, which would lead to the land purchase, if the grant 
application is approved. 
 
In South Africa, land that has been acquired through land reform programme, 
particularly communally owned land, is largely held and managed by either of the two 
main communal property institutions, namely the Communal Property Association 
(CPA) or the Trust. This arrangement is seen mostly on SLAG, Restitution and some 
LRAD projects that have big numbers of beneficiaries. Those with fewer members 
often register as Close Corporations. Land holding institutions in the study area 
mostly fall under CPA,; only two projects had Trust arrangements.  
 
The CPA is a legal entity registered in terms of the CPA Act, 28 of 1996. This Act 
enables communities to form legal jurisdiction persons in order to acquire, hold and 
manage property in common, on a basis agreed to by members of a community, in 
terms of a written constitution7. Provision is made for communities to be structured in 
terms of the framework of communal property associations rather than in the form of 
individual common-law ownership. By so doing, this affords individual members 
                                                 
7 Communal Property Association Act No. 28 of 1996. www.dla.gov.za  
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equal rights and it incorporates a strong lineage to the land. Further providing 
guidelines on how individual land rights should be recognised (Section 12, subsection 
1- 4). The CPA Act was promulgated to ensure the security of tenure for all members 
and beneficiaries of communally owned land, thus protecting members of those 
communities from discrimination either of ethnic or social origin.   
 
The Trust in this instance is established in terms of the Trust Property Control Act, 
No. 57 of 1988 to hold and manage the land that has been acquired communally. The 
Trust Deed is developed, as a document that sets out the terms of a Trust, i.e. the 
purposes of the Trust, how the management structure or executive committee is 
appointed, their powers and the use to which they must put the property acquired.    
These two pieces of legislation have varying legal implications in terms of the role the 
Department of Land Affairs could play in the event of these institutions not being able 
to function normally.  While the CPA Act makes provision for the Director General of 
Land Affairs to intervene on ailing CPAs, with powers to either restructure or 
deregister the institutions, with the Trust it is only the court that has the power to 
amend provisions of trust a deed. This is arguably impeding on the Department of 
Land Affairs to make interventions in cases where institutional problems persist.  
 
The pace of land reform in South African has been slow. The target was to 
redistribute 30% of white owned agricultural land to the poor and the landless, 
initially over a period of five years (from 1994 to 1999), which was later extended by 
20 years, to 2014. Land delivery through the three branches of land reform was at 
3.6% by June 2005, according to the Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs 
(2005). This is over an 11 year period and the question is whether the remaining 
26.4% would be achievable within the remaining 9 years to meet the target of 30%8 
by 2014, which translates to the delivery of 2.2 million per year. The Government has 
also set itself a target of finalising all restitution claims by March 2008 (Mbeki, 2006). 
It appears however that the Land Claims Commission is faced with severe capacity 
problems, which might affect the achievement of this target. When reporting to the 
Parliament’s Agriculture and Land Affairs Committee, the Chief Land Claims 
Commissioner stated that 72,326 out of total 79,696 land claims lodged were settled 
                                                 
8 25 million of the 82 million hectares of prime agricultural land that is owned by white commercial farmers 
(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2005)  
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by June 2006, and cautioning that time might not be enough to complete all the claims 
by 2008, attributing this to high staff turn over in the department (Hamlyn, 2006).  
 
The volume of land redistribution through private transactions is not known. Although 
these transactions seem not to have made a significant impact, further research is 
required to determine their extent of contribution to the overall land reform 
programme.  
 
Seemingly, the State has taken note of the widespread criticism and a call from all 
quarters to fast track land reform, hence the decision to start proactive land acquisition 
and also linking it with some agricultural development programmes as stated in 
Didiza (2006) and a review of “willing seller, willing buyer” principle (Mbeki, 2006). 
This could be seen as the beginning of attempts to fast-track land reform in South 
Africa, which analysts see as long overdue. Lahiff (2005) argues that to fast track 
redistribution, state should also play an active role by facilitating between the seller 
and the buyer, and that the state should be proactively acquiring land for 
redistribution. Land delivery in South Africa over the 11 year period 1994-2005 is 
shown in the table below. 
 
Table: 2.1: South African land delivery, 1994 to 2005. 
Programme Hectares 
transferred 
Percentage delivery per 
programme 
Restitution 916 470 28%
Redistribution 1 347 943 43%
Tenure Reform 100 175 4%
State land disposal 772 626 25%
Total 3 137 214 100%
Source: Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2005 
 
In the Northern Cape Province 982 962 hectares were transferred from 1994 to June 
2006, which is 3.32% of total white owned agricultural land (approximately 30 
million) in the province (Department of Agriculture & Land Reform, 2006). The table 
below shows the extent of land transferred in the Northern Cape from 1994 to June 
2006. 
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Table: 2:2: Extent of land transferred in the Northern Cape, 1994 to June 2006. 
 
Programme Hectares Beneficiaries 
SLAG 105, 590 3, 137
LRAD 95, 718 1, 076
Municipal commonage 493, 675 N/A9
Restitution 287, 764 5, 912 h/h  
(41, 722 
individuals)
Tenure Reform 215 497
Total 982, 962 51, 847
Source: Department of Agriculture and Land Reform, 2006 
 
2.5. Post transfer support 
 
The struggle of land reform beneficiaries does not end with the receiving of land, as 
post settlement support seems to be the next challenge in line to deal with.  
 
For many land reform beneficiaries, access to the necessary support is still a major 
challenge. There has never been a well structured support package that is 
comprehensive (i.e. inclusive of training, finance, access to production inputs, 
appropriate technology and extension service) either from government nor private 
sector. Support that is available is in many instances not adequate to meet all the 
needs of the farmers and has not been available to all the projects (Bradstock, 2005).  
 
Some analysts argue that the failure to provide post settlement support is due to the 
disjuncture between land reform policies and development intentions of government, 
and failure to conceptualise land reform beyond the land transfer stage (Lahiff, 2006). 
For Kepe & Cousins (2002) land reform will only be effective if embedded within 
broader programmes to restructure the agrarian economy, i.e. access to support 
mechanisms by beneficiaries, e.g. finance and markets. A similar view is put forward 
by Windfuhr (2002), who argues that agrarian reform is central to land reform, which 
should also be integrated into broader rural development. De Villiers & van den Berg 
(2006) cite various experiences of land reform cases, which provide some positive 
                                                 
9 Number of beneficiaries is not applicable to Commonage because, according to DLA, commonages are open to 
everyone and farmers come and go, thus difficult to keep a constant number. Commonage, in this instance, refers 
to land bought by DLA to extend the municipal land that is used for grazing by communities (DLA, 2004) 
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lessons that could contribute to a more effective programme of post-settlement 
support.  
 
Until 2004, the government did not have a dedicated programme for post-settlement 
support. The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was 
introduced during 2004/05 financial year as a support programme primarily for 
beneficiaries of land reform. The six pillars of CASP, according to DOA10 (2003) are 
aimed at promoting and facilitating agricultural development targeting beneficiaries of 
the land reform and agrarian reforms programmes. The first and second years of 
CASP implementation focused mainly on on-farm and off-farm infrastructure 
development. CASP money is given to provinces as a conditional grant from the 
National Treasury. The number of land reform beneficiaries is taken into 
consideration when working out the provinces’ allocations. Provinces are required to 
indicate how the money is going to be spent and on what. Plans are assessed by a 
panel at the National Department of Agriculture, which then makes recommendations 
for approval by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The essence of land reform is to redistribute assets and empower the landless in a 
context of rural development, poverty alleviation and the addressing of social 
disparities. Access to land has been a fundamental need for rural people in particular, 
and inequitable distribution of land exacerbates poverty and destitution. Some 
experience of land reform, however, shows that despite the varied approaches 
followed by different countries, the proposed beneficiaries (the rural poor) are not 
always the ones benefiting. While privatisation and individualisation of property 
rights in public and communal lands have varied outcomes, in most cases these are 
unfavourable to the rural poor (Borras, 2005). The issue of administrative deficiencies 
and in some instances, lack of political will for speedy reforms is at the centre of most 
land reform failures. Land reforms in Kenya and Zambia, for example, have left many 
of the rural poor in poverty while benefiting the elite.  
 
                                                 
10 Draft Programme for a Comprehensive Agricultural Support Package 
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South Africa’s slow pace of land reform is widely attributed to the government’s 
laissez faire approach to redistribution and reluctance to consider an approach of more 
radical expropriation, and inadequate attention being paid to post-transfer support. For 
South Africa guidance was provided by the National Land Summit of July 2005, in 
the form of resolutions, as to what the public and private sectors should do to reach 
the 30% redistribution target and, most importantly, to make land reform a success11. 
It is for government to implement the strategies recommended by the summit. 
Maintaining the status quo might have negative consequences as it has become 
apparent that the current mechanisms for land reform are incapable of achieving the 
expected redistribution of land and the restructuring of the agricultural sector.    
 
It is increasingly clear that land reform alone will not achieve rural development or 
poverty alleviation, but must be combined with other agrarian reforms, such as access 
to capital, training and markets. 
                                                 
11 Viable and sustainable redistributed farms for rural economic development, Department of Agriculture, 2006 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL PROFILE OF NORTHERN CAPE PROVINCE 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction  
 
In this chapter an overview of agriculture in the Northern Cape Province is presented, 
looking at production trends and current and future prospects in terms of production. 
The chapter further describes the study area and the target farming units (redistributed 
plots), highlighting the historical background of the Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme. 
Features such as climate, soil and rainfall patterns are described.  
 
Although the Northern Cape is in general drier than the rest of South Africa, with 
relatively little high potential agricultural land, it produces some of the country’s 
finest quality agricultural products (Department of Agriculture and Land Reform, 
2006). The province has become a major exporter of table grapes produced along the 
Orange River and is world renowned for the quality of its meat, namely Karoo lamb, 
ostrich, beef and venison (Northern Cape, 2005). The Northern Cape is also well 
known for the production of wool, mohair and karakul pelts as well as dates, citrus 
products, wine and raisins. High temperatures and low rainfall in the irrigated areas of 
the province normally see the production of good quality lucerne, in demand for both 
the dairy and poultry industries.  
     
Central to agricultural activities in the province is its climate and natural resources. 
The province is prone to drought. Even in years of adequate overall rainfall, rains may 
start late or finish early, with dry spells at crucial times in the growing season. 
According to Heyns (2001) rainfall in the province averages 450mm per annum. The 
dryland agricultural potential of the province is thus very low. Most crops produced 
are dependent on irrigation, thus making irrigation the major source of agricultural 
activity in the Northern Cape Province. The Orange and the Vaal rivers provide the 
basis of the thriving agricultural sector. The majority of horticultural and viticulture 
crops are grown under irrigation along the Orange River, while the Vaalharts 
irrigation scheme on the Vaal River produces mainly wheat, fruits, peanuts, maize and 
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cotton. The extent of land used for production of these crops is discussed in Section 4 
(below). 
 
Groundwater sources provide the main supply of water for domestic consumption and 
for livestock. Approximately 30% of the population in 87 settlements are dependent 
on ground water resources of variable quality (Meyer, 2006). This source is, however, 
limited in the western and southern sections of the province, which are dryer with 
limited ground water. Boreholes are the main source of water supply in the 
Namaqualand area, while the Hantam area relies mostly on water from the Calvinia 
dam and, to a lesser extent, boreholes.  
 
The rich natural resource endowments of the Northern Cape are a significant driver of 
economic activity in the province. Agriculture and agro-processing are responsible for 
more than 10% of the Northern Cape’s economic activity, and approximately 22.8% 
of employment (BSG Investments, 2003). 
 
 
3.2. Land use patterns 
 
 
The total land area of the Northern Cape Province is approx. 36 million hectares, 
which is 29.5% of the total area of South Africa. Of this, approximately 33.8 million 
ha is classified as farmland, of which 86% constitutes grazing land, 13% is used for 
nature conservation and 1% is classified as potential arable land (Department of 
Agriculture, 2000). The Northern Cape is characterised by a diverse agricultural 
sector with two main production systems, namely, extensive livestock farming and 
intensive irrigated cropping.  
 
Cattle farming is concentrated mainly in the north-eastern areas while sheep farming 
is predominant in the south-eastern parts of the province. Irrigation farming occurs 
mainly along the major rivers, the Orange and Vaal. Some tributaries such as the 
Harts, Riet and Modder rivers also make a significant contribution to irrigation. Rain-
fed crop production is limited to the winter rainfall area in the south-western section. 
Game farming is predominantly found in a band across the centre of the province, 
with smaller concentrations to the south.   
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The present land use pattern in the province is shown in the table below. Most of the 
surface area of the province, about 94% is utilised for agricultural or other natural 
resource based activities12. Mining also forms part of the natural resource based 
activities in Northern Cape, although the proportion of land used by the mining 
industry is small. 
 
  Table 3.1: Land use patterns in the Northern Cape Province. 
Land use Hectares Percentage  
Grazing 29, 089, 367 80.8%
Arable 454, 465 1.26%
Nature conservation 4, 295, 068 11.9%
Other 2 ,161, 100 6.0%
Total 36, 000, 000 100.00%
  Source: Meyer, 2006 
 
According to the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform, Environment & 
Conservation (2003), the Northern Cape has four agro-ecological zones (Fig 3.1). The 
zones are as follows: 
• Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme situated in a valley between the Ghaapseberg to 
the west and the Marroccan ridges to the east, about 110km away from 
Kimberley. 
• Middle Region (Vaal/Orange) covering the Vaal River from Barkley West to 
the Orange Vaal confluence near Douglas.  It also covers the Orange River 
from van der Kloof Dam to Boegoeberg Dam. 
• Lower- Orange River stretching from Boegoeberg Dam to the West Coast. 
• Karoo corridor, running from Colesburg through to Groblershoop, which is 
the centre of sheep, goats, ostrich and game farming. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Nature conservation, eco-tourism and game farming 
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      Figure: 3.1 
 
      Source: De Bruyn, 2006 
 
Irrigated agriculture along the banks of the Vaal and Orange Rivers offer the best 
potential for the production of high value agricultural commodities for export and 
domestic markets. The extent of the area under irrigation in 2005 was 140 500 
hectares. The breakdown is given in the table below. 
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Table 3.2: Land under irrigation in 2005 
Area Hectares
Vaalharts 32 000
Barkley West 8 500
Kalkfontein 3 500
Vanderkloof to Boegoeberg 
(Petrusville, Hopetown, Douglas, 
Prieska) 
47 000
Boegoeberg to Vioolsdrift (Lower 
Orange River) 
45 000
Total 140 000
  Source: ABSA, 2005 
In terms of extensive rangeland utilisation, low carrying capacity is the limiting factor 
for growth in the livestock industry, which is primarily dependent on natural grazing 
(DALREC, 2003). Recommended carrying capacity ranges from 120ha per large 
stock unit in the far north western part to 8ha per large stock unit in the north eastern 
part of the province. The focus, according to the Department, should rather be on 
increased efficiency through utilisation of indigenous breeds and the development of 
niche markets, such as organic meat and goat meat. ABSA (2005) asserts that there is 
a growing potential in Boer goat farming for the purpose of meat production due to 
good demand. Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1 below shows trends in livestock numbers over 
ten year period, from 1996 to 2005. The indication is that there has not been a 
significance increase in livestock numbers over this period, which could be attributed 
to limited veld carrying capacities.  
 
  Table: 3.3: Livestock numbers, 1996 – 2005 
Year Cattle Sheep Goats
1996 479 360 7 245 844 545 711
1997 492 763 7 376 655 537 923
1998 516 047 7 373 739 569 224
1999 503 384 6 870 087 550 099
2000 509 856 6 475 785 526 858
2001 502 929 6 399 567 546 230
2002 491 810 6 490 010 636 241
2003 490 761 6 367 823 623 074
2004 477 005 6 406 501 573 903
2005 482 726 6 353 562 574 285
  Source: Meyer, 2006 
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Figure 3.2 
Livestock numbers in ten years
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3.3. The role of agriculture in the Northern Cape provincial economy 
 
Despite the largely semi-arid and arid environment, the agricultural sector in the 
province is regarded as among the main contributors to employment, food security 
and economic growth. Northern Cape’s economy is dominated by primary production 
in mining, agriculture and tourism. According to the Northern Cape Provincial 
Government (2004) the contribution by the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector to 
the provincial GDP have increased from 6.2% in 1996 to 7.3% in 2002. The table 3.4 
below shows the percentage contribution of the various economic sectors to the GDP 
of the Northern Cape. 
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    Table 3.4: Sector contribution to the GDP of the Northern Cape, in 2002.  
 
    Source: Northern Cape Provincial Growth and Development Strategy, 2004 
 
 
According to Statistics SA (2002), the contribution of agriculture, forestry and fishing 
industries to the Province’s GDP was 8.6% in 2002, an increase of 1.3% from 1996, 
which illustrates the importance of agriculture in the province.   
 
The sector is also the second largest employer of labour after mining, accounting for 
22.8% of employment (formal and informal). Employment is largely casual and 
seasonal, which accounted for 69% of the total employment in 2002. The 2002 
national census of commercial agriculture states that Northern Cape agriculture sector 
had an increase in the number of paid workers of 23,4% between 1993 and 2002, from 
75 969 to 99 251, compared to a 13,9% decrease nationally (Stats SA, 2002). In terms 
of export earnings about 35% of agricultural produce in the province is exported, 
which accounts for 32% of total export earnings in the province ABSA, 2005). More 
than 80% of table grapes produced in the Lower Orange River area are being 
exported. Export for citrus stands at between 60 and 70 percent, while raisins stand at 
80%.   
Constant 1995 prices – Rand 
million 
1996 Percentage 
(%)
2002 Percentage 
(%) 
Primary Industries 3 748 32.0 3 900 31.0
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 725 6.2 921 7.3
Mining and quarrying 3 023 25.8 2 979 23.7
Secondary Industries 1 308 11.2 1 269 10.1
Manufacturing 514 4.4 532 4.2
Electricity and water 545 4.7 502 4.0
Construction 249 2.1 235 1.9
Tertiary Industries 6 655 56.8 7 406 58.9
Wholesale & retail trade; hotel 
& restaurant 1 359 11.6 1 320 10.5
Transport and communication 1 382 11.8 1 611 12.8
Finance, real estate and 
business services 1 438 12.3 1 717 13.7
Community, social and other 
personal services 908 7.8 1 031 8.2
General government services 1 568 13.4 1 727 13.7
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According to Stats, SA (2002) farm income in the Northern Cape in 2002, according 
to main activity was 42% for animal and animal products; 27% for field crop while 
horticultural crops were at 30%. 1% was for other products (Figure 3.1) 
Figure 3.3 
Northern Cape farm income according to main 
activity, 2002
42%
27%
30%
1%
Animal
Field crops
Horticultural
Other products
 
 
3.4. Northern Cape agrarian structure 
 
A total of 95% of agricultural land in the Northern Cape is held in freehold title, 
mainly by white commercial farmers, with some portions (information on the extent 
not available) belonging to mining houses such as De Beers and Khumba Resources. 
Approximately 5% of the farm land is owned communally and this is mainly for small 
scale stock farming (Department of Agriculture & Land Reform 2006). Land reform 
has redistributed 982 962 hectares through various branches of land reform 
programme, from 1994 to June 2006, which translates to 3. 32% of the Northern 
Cape’s land. 
 
The table below compares the structure of Northern Cape commercial agricultural 
production within the national context. From the data it is evident that farms are larger 
than the national average, the production processes are less labour intensive (i.e. 
10.5% of total workers on 35.9% of the total agricultural land in the country), while 
remuneration (i.e. the wage bill of the workers) is considerably lower than the rest of 
the country. Gross farm income is lower than the average for the country. 
 
 
 
 
 34
 
Table: 3.5: Comparison of Northern Cape commercial agricultural production 
with national in 2002 
 
 Northern 
Cape
RSA total Northern 
Cape/RSA % 
Farming area (ha) 29 734 987 82 748 886 35,93 
Average farm size (ha) 4 863 1 806 269,29 
Number of farms 6 114 45 818 13,34 
Number of farm workers 99 251 940 815 10,55 
Gross remuneration 
R’000 442 211 6 215 583 7,11 
Gross farm income R’000 3 671 881 52 971 232 6,93 
Spending on intermediate 
inputs R’000 2 730 673 42 092 135 6,49 
Capital expenditure 
R’000 259 240 2 946 773 8,80 
Total debt R’000 3 086 128 30 857 891 10,00 
Data source: Statistics South Africa, 2002  
 
 
3.5. Major agricultural industries in the province 
 
 
This section provides a brief description of major agricultural industries in the 
Northern Cape, with the aim of showing the potential areas for growth in the 
agricultural sector of the province.  
 
3.5.1. Table grapes 
 
 
Northern Cape is the second largest producer of South Africa’s table grapes after the 
Western Cape. It produces 25% of the country’s total production of 481 077 tons. 
More than 80% of Northern Cape’s table grapes are produced in the Lower Orange 
River area and are exported mainly to the United Kingdom and Europe. According to 
Orange River Producers Alliance (ORPA) (2005) the 2004/05 season saw the export 
of 14, 64 millions cartons (65 000 tons). An increase of up to 20 million cartons for 
export was estimated. But, due to changing marketing and economic conditions, as 
previously stated exports stabilised to 14 million cartons per annum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
 
3.5.2. Wine 
 
 
The Northern Cape is home to the Orange River Wine Cellars Co-op, the second 
largest wine making co-operative in the world with over 740 members who produce 
wine grapes and 445 farmers who produce juice grapes. According to Cruywagen13 
the co-operative has also opened up a market for small black farmers who are not 
necessarily members, with a 6% market quota. At present most of the Orange River 
wine produced is intended for the South African market with a small proportion for 
export market. According to ABSA (2005) both export and domestic markets 
experience shortages of white wines at present, which may lead to a positive price 
outlook and a positive effect on South African producer prices. 
 
3.5.3. Dried fruit 
 
 
The Northern Cape produces approximately 4% of the total world production and 
90% of South Africa’s total dried vine fruits. In the Lower Orange region, raisins are 
mainly produced from Sultanina vines, while cultivars such as Merbein are increasing 
in popularity. The majority (75% - 80%) of raisins are exported to markets worldwide, 
primarily to Europe, but also to Asia (Japan, Taiwan & Korea), Canada and the USA 
(ORPA, 2006).  
 
 
3.5.4. Field crops 
 
Wheat and maize are the province’s biggest field crop enterprises, contributing 17.9% 
and 4.6%, respectively, of South Africa’s total production (Crop Estimates 
Committee, 2005). Other field crops that make significant contribution to the 
agricultural earnings are groundnuts, cotton and lucerne. 
Wheat: Field crop production in the Northern Cape is dominated by irrigated wheat. 
The value of output of this crop has grown from R139m in 1990/91 to an estimated 
R216m by 1994/95. The area planted to the crop has remained fairly constant at 
                                                 
13 Meeting with Herman Cruywagen and Johan Olivier: Wine Trust initiative for emerging farmers in NC, 10 July 
2006  
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between 52 000 and 55 000 hectares, and yields have increased slightly in recent years 
reflecting improving farming productivity. 
Maize: Maize production has grown steadily during the 1990s. The area under maize 
stood at approximately 47 000 hectares in 2001, representing 4.6% of national maize 
output.  
Cotton: Between 4 000 and 18 000 hectares of cotton have been planted in the 
Northern Cape. Cotton has been produced on a larger scale in the past but falling 
producer prices in the late 1980s discouraged production of this expensive-to-grow 
and management-intensive crop. Cotton gross income in the province is estimated at 
between R8.25 million and R14.13 million for 1993/94 and 1994/95 respectively.  
Groundnuts: Approximately 20% of groundnuts produced in South Africa are grown 
in the Northern Cape, on an average of 5 000 hectares; this generated sales of around 
R34.6 million in 1992/93. 
Lucerne: Lucerne is planted on over 20 000 ha in the Northern Cape, and represents 
an important crop for the province. The climatic conditions of the province facilitate 
the production of high quality hay from lucerne, exported to European and Middle 
East markets for the chicken, dairy and horse racing industries. 
 
3.5.5. Livestock and animal products 
 
Livestock - sheep, goats and beef cattle - enterprises collectively contribute up to 37% 
of provincial gross farming income (Meyer, 2006). 
• Sheep: Sheep farming for meat represents the second largest sector in 
Northern Cape agriculture, after wheat production. The industry benefits from 
the low price and abundance of land in the province. Branding of Karoo lamb 
has grown in recent years, with the product able to command premium prices. 
• Cattle: Approximately 4% of South African beef emanates from the Northern 
Cape, largely from the Kalahari District. 
• Goats: About 8. 7% of the national goat number of 6.44 million was recorded 
for Northern Cape at the end of November 2005.     
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• Wool and Mohair: Wool production in the Northern Cape represents 
approximately 11% of South Africa’s national wool output. The Northern 
Cape is responsible for approximately 7% of South African mohair output.  
• Game Farming: This sector is one of the fastest expanding farming activities 
in the Northern Cape, replacing traditional livestock farming. Estimates from 
the mid-1990s suggest that there were about 800 game ranches in the Northern 
Cape, with a total area of 4.2 million ha. Although there are no confirmed 
statistics depicting the size and value of the industry, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the industry is growing at around 10% per annum, mostly in the 
North East of the province, as game farming is increasingly being viewed as a 
commercially attractive and relatively to low-risk alternative to traditional 
animal husbandry. 
 
3.6. Description of the study area 
 
 
3.6.1. Background of the Vaalharts irrigation scheme 
 
The Vaalharts scheme derived its name from the two rivers, the Vaal and the Harts 
Rivers which flow through it. According to Van Garderen et al (1934) the potential of 
the valley as an irrigation scheme was realised as early as the 1880s, although the 
actual development of the area only started in 1934. The weir on the Vaal River was 
completed in 1938 with first plots allocated the same year, starting at Jan Kempdorp 
(North Canal area) and expanding to the north-west (Snyders, 2006). The irrigation 
scheme is divided into the West Canal Area comprising about 5 000ha and the North 
Canal Area of about 24 000ha. The latter area consists of 1 000 plots of 25ha each, of 
which 24ha on each plot is under irrigation.  
 
Vaalharts scheme was established by the government to settle poor white people, most 
of who were combatants from the World War II. According to De Bruyn14 the 
community that was staying close to the area where the scheme was established was 
forcibly removed because government did not want any black settlement closer to the 
scheme.  
                                                 
14 Personal interview on the history of Vaalharts, 11 July 2006.  
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Each family received 30 morgans (25 hectares) plot to cultivate and make a living out 
it. The land was purchased for R8 000 with a loan funding from government, to be 
repaid over 15 years. For each plot the state provided 4 mules and a plough, and a soft 
loan for production inputs. A market was guaranteed as the produce was sold through 
a central marketing channel. Loan repayments were deducted from the proceeds of 
sales and the farmer would get the difference thereof. The support package, which 
included extension services and production loans, was compulsory. Government 
established and subsidised co-operatives, which provided such services. Farmers who 
failed to meet the prescribed yield, or could not repay their loans were, according to 
De Bruyn, immediately replaced. Government also provided housing facilities (for 
free) on each plot and provided other social amenities such as schools and health 
facilities.  
 
Irrigation water for the scheme is diverted from the Vaalharts weir between Christiana 
and Warrenton. The weir receives water from the Bloemhof Dam which in turn is 
augmented from the Vaal Dam.   
 
 
3.6.2. Soils 
 
The Vaalharts irrigation scheme is known for its deep sandy soils which are prone to 
water logging and salinisation due to insufficient natural drainage.  Vaalharts area is 
characterised by two types of soil, namely, Hutton and Clovelly/Sunbury. Typical 
soils in the Vaalharts scheme consist of 8% clay, 2% silt, 68% fine sand and 22% 
medium and coarse sand (Streutker, 1977). Soils are typically prone to compaction, 
both under flood as well as overhead irrigation. 
 
3.6.3. Climate and Rainfall 
 
 
Vaalharts is situated at an altitude of 1175m above sea level. Vaalharts is known for 
its cold winters and long warm summers with the occurrence of frost, hail and storms. 
The average frost period lasts 103 days and typically stretches from 20 May to 31 
August.  An average of 30 frost days is expected during this period (Gerber, 2006). 
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The area receives the annual rainfall of 450mm on average with 89% of precipitation 
occurring from October to April.  Peak rainfall occurs from January to March.   
 
The average maximum temperatures for January and June are 32ºc and 18º 
respectively, while the average minimum for the same periods are 16ºc and 1ºc 
respectively. The table below shows means temperatures and rainfall of Vaalharts 
over 36 year period. 
 
Table: 3.5: Mean temperatures and rainfall over 36 years 
 
 
VAALHARTS 
 Max. 
Temp 
J F M A M J J A S O N D 
Average 32.4 30.9 28.8 25.5 22.0 19.2 19.6 22.3 26.2 28.6 30.4 31.9 
Highest 41.2 38.4 37.0 33.4 37.7 27.7 27.5 31.3 35.4 38.2 38.8 40.3 
Min. 
Temp  
Average 17.1 16.6 14.7 10.2 5.4 1.9 1.5 3.4 7.6 11.0 13.7 15.8 
Lowest 5.1 2.8 3.5 -2.8 -5.6 -7.8 -8.9 -8.2 -6.1 4.5 3.9 3.1 
Mean 
Temp  
Average 24.8 23.8 21.7 17.9 13.7 10.5 10.5 12.8 16.9 19.8 22.0 23.9 
Rainfall 
 
Average 75.9 63.5 71.8 51.6 19.9 9.5 4.3 8.6 11.3 24.6 45.7 58.0 
  Source: Gerber, 2005 
 
The mean annual evaporation is more than 2 300mm which is equivalent to 6.65mm 
daily evaporation throughout the year. Evaporation peaks in December at above 
9.5mm per day.  
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3.6.4. Suitability of the area for agricultural production 
 
 
According to the prevailing soils and climate, a wide range of annual and perennial 
crops excluding tropical fruits, are suited to be planted at Vaalharts. The table lists 
some of the crops that are well suited for the Vaalharts geographical area. 
 
Table: 3.6: Suitable crops for Vaalharts area 
 
Summer field crops Remarks 
Cotton Well adapted 
Maize Well adapted  
Groundnuts Well adapted 
Dry beans Adapted  
Soya beans Adapted 
Winter field Crops Remarks 
Wheat Well adapted 
Barley Well adapted 
Canola Adapted  
Perennial field crops Remarks 
Lucerne Adapted, but prone to losses due to 
summer rain.  
Tree crops Remarks 
Pecan nuts Well adapted but slow growing.   
Olives Well adapted but slow growing
Citrus Marginal due to frost 
Wine grapes Generally low yields 
Vegetable crops Remarks 
Tomatoes Well adapted 
Pumpkin Well adapted 
Cabbage Well adapted 
Root vegetables Prone to nematodes 
Onions Well adapted 
   Source: Gerber, 2005 
 
 
3.6.5. Production data for crops produced in the Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme 
 
 
Field crops, such as maize, wheat, barley, lucerne and groundnuts are the main crops 
in the area. All the crops are cultivated under irrigation. Flood irrigation comprises 
approximately 70% of the irrigation, while pivot irrigation contributes to the 
remainder (Venter, 2006). According to Griekwaland Wes Ko-operasie (GWK) 
(2003) some farmers are starting to replace annual cash crops with permanent crops 
like pecan nuts, olives, citrus and wine grapes. ABSA’s view however is that the trend 
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will not last long because of initial high establishment costs of permanent crops versus 
low producer prices. Yield fluctuations, especially in olives and wine grapes also 
increase the risk. Table 3.7 below indicates hectares and volumes of production for 
main crops in the Vaalharts Scheme for the past five years. Annual cash crops, such as 
maize, wheat, cotton, groundnuts and barley are mostly planted on rotational basis.  
 
 
Table: 3.7: Hectares and volumes of main crops produced in Vaalharts for the 
past   five years 
 
Crop Hectares planted Average tons/hectare 
Maize   6 500   9.0 
Wheat 12 000   6.0 
Barley      200   6.0 
Groundnuts   7 000   3.0  
Cotton   2 000   3.5 
Lucerne   7 500  16.0  
Olives      400    6.0 
Pecan nuts      100    5.0 
Wine grapes      300 9.5 
Total 36 000  
Source: Venter, 2006 
  
 
3.6.6. General challenges of production faced by farmers in the Vaalharts scheme 
 
 
This section gives a brief description of commercial agriculture in the Vaalharts 
scheme, with a particular focus on the challenges faced by established commercial 
farmers.  
  
As it is the case in other parts of South Africa, horticultural enterprises in Vaalharts 
are experiencing low profitability due to a variety of factors, among them a strong 
rand in the past two years and increased competition in international markets. It is a 
widespread view among commercial farmers in Vaalharts that price volatility due to 
imports, particularly of wheat and cotton, and yield fluctuations of maize pose 
particular risks in the production of these commodities.  
 
Water logging and soil salinity in the scheme could also contribute towards the 
decline in agricultural production if not given attention. According to Van der 
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Merwe15 waterlogging and salinity have become serious problems due to the poor 
state of the sub-surface drainage system. Apparently, the drainage system has never 
been upgraded since the establishment of the scheme in 1938. The National 
Department of Agriculture has made available R250 million, over a ten year period to 
address this problem (Van Coller, 2006). Farmers would also be required to use water 
sparingly by adapting their irrigation systems so as to avert the recurrence of the 
problem.  
 
Another challenge that farmers are faced with is the uncertainty around the pending 
restitution claim on the Vaalharts scheme. A claim was registered by the Mothibi 
community, under the leadership of Chief Mankurwane in 1998 with the North 
West/Gauteng Regional Land Claims Commissioner (RLCC). The claim is at the 
research stage and although it is widely disputed by land owners (commercial 
farmers), it has brought uncertainty and uneasiness among the farmers and is affecting 
their planning for their farms (Van der Merwe, 2006). If successful, the claim will 
also have an effect on the redistributed land. According to Ms Nkoane16 of Northern 
Cape Provincial Land Reform Office, in the event that the claim is successful, 
alternative land could be acquired for the claimant community.   
 
3.7. Conclusion  
 
Agriculture undoubtedly forms a significant part of the economy of the Northern Cape 
Province and indications are that it will remain so for a long time. It is imperative, 
therefore that this sector should undergo transformation so that previously excluded 
farmers can participate as equal members. This is the challenge that is taken up by all 
spheres of government, particularly through programmes of land and agricultural 
development. A key part of this response is the establishment of black farmers in the 
high potential areas, such as the Vaalharts irrigation scheme, which is the subject of 
the chapters that follow. 
 
Furthermore, production for the export market is expanding rapidly and provides a 
window of opportunity for new entrants to the sector. To remain competitive, the 
quality of products will have to be maintained and improved continuously, which 
                                                 
15 Discussion after the meeting with AgriNC and NAFU, 15 June 2006 
16 Telephonic discussion on 27 July 2006 
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warrants the provision of relevant knowledge and expertise at all stages of the 
production process. Thus, the importance of training and capacity building for those 
who benefit from land reform is critical so that they can take part when such 
opportunities arise. 
 
The agricultural sector in the Northern Cape is amongst the principal sources of 
employment in the province. It is therefore important that the redistributed farms 
maintain their productivity status, so that the benefit could also extent to those who 
depend on them for livelihoods.  
 
Vaalharts scheme is intensive horticulture farming, which is characterised by rapid 
crop rotations, irrigation dependence, intricate and precise management. It is of 
primary importance therefore that new entrants into farming at the scheme are well 
prepared and supported in order to keep up with the demands of this farming 
environment.  
 
Vaalharts scheme is currently faced with a problem of water logging and salinity, 
which warrants serious attention if its agricultural potential is to be sustained. 
Sustainable use and management of the present resources (soil and water for example) 
becomes critical and new land reform farmers should be made aware of this. Coming 
from a different farming environment, they would need to be informed about suitable 
farming practices that would contribute towards sustainable farming in terms of 
conserving the available resources.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings of the field research carried out on 
land reform projects at Vaalharts irrigation scheme from March 2006 to August 2006. 
It also provides a description of land redistribution projects, land sizes and intensity of 
production on recently transferred land at the Vaalharts scheme. A total of 377.8772 
ha of land have been redistributed to 453 beneficiaries through SLAG and LRAD sub-
programmes of the land reform programme. The views of various stakeholders in land 
reform in the Vaalharts area and the challenges faced by farmers, including the 
support available to new farmers, are analysed. The views of commercial farmers, as 
well as other stakeholders, on the performance of land reform projects in the 
Vaalharts scheme are also reflected. 
 
Data on farming activities is drawn from interviews with beneficiaries who were 
somehow engaged on the land. Additional information was also gathered during 
meetings with farmers, both (white) commercial and (black) emerging, interactions 
with officials of the Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA) and Northern Cape 
Provincial Land Reform Office (NCPLRO), and documentary reports from these two 
institutions. Information was also obtained from focussed discussions with 
agricultural co-operatives and financial institutions active in the Vaalharts areas and 
from various internet sites.  The focus was on identifying factors that constrain 
agricultural production as well as reasons for declining or lack of production on the 
redistributed plots in the scheme. 
  
4.2. Land redistribution in the Vaalharts Scheme 
 
The land redistribution programme in the Vaalharts Scheme dates back to 1995, with 
the purchase of Silverdale farm and Plot B25 in 2001 through the SLAG programme, 
a component of the land reform programme of the Department of Land Affairs 
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(DLA). SLAG was later replaced by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development programme (LRAD), which brought acceleration in the redistribution of 
land in the scheme.  
 
From 1995 to June 2006 approximately 378 hectares, which is about 1 % of the land 
in the Vaalharts Scheme, was redistributed through SLAG and LRAD to 453 
beneficiaries organised in eight groups, or projects (Nkoane, 2006). Projects in this 
instance involve portions of land that were redistributed to groups of between 16 and 
185 black farmers through the aforesaid land reform sub-programmes (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs 2001). A breakdown of hectares redistributed, total 
number of beneficiaries per project and an average number of hectares per beneficiary 
is shown in the table below.  
 
Table 4.1: Breakdown of hectares redistributed in the Vaalharts Scheme, total 
number of hectares redistributed, total number of beneficiaries and number of 
hectares per beneficiary.   
 
Project Size (ha) No. of 
beneficiaries
Hectares/ 
beneficiary 
Boichoko 
(Silverdale) 
128.4796 185 0.6944 
Moso 40.9763 40 1.0244 
Tswaraganang 84.0000 90 0.9333 
Kopano 23.3075 25 0.9323 
Batsamaya Mmogo 48.8035 45 1.0845 
Ditaung 21.7722 21 1.0367 
Bonita Park Olives 9.5881 11 1.1472 
Iphemeleng 20.9500 36 0.5819 
Total 377 8772 453  
Source: Nkoane, 2006 
 
Land area per beneficiary on these projects ranges from 0.5819ha to 1.3125ha, with 
an average of 0.95 hectares per beneficiary.  
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4.3. Research findings 
 
4.3.1.  The Beneficiaries 
 
For this study, a total of 101 farmers were interviewed. This constitutes 100% of the 
active farmers and comprises 22% of the 453 beneficiaries of land reform projects in 
the scheme. Interviews were mainly with members who were found working on the 
land, especially where production was underway. In instances where production was 
not happening, interviews were conducted with members who turned up at the site for 
interviews. Several attempts were also made to contact other beneficiaries who were 
not active on the project or had lost interest in the project without success. For 
instance it was the same small group of 18 out of a total of 185 members who turned 
up for both the interview sessions arranged for Boichoko.  
 
“Other members will not bother to come because they do not recognise the current 
interim executive committee and have dissociated themselves with any activity on the 
farm”, said Mr. Siko, chairperson of the interim committee.  
 
There is, however, very little activity on the farm and it would appear that, except for 
the 18 that are busy with lucerne production, the rest do not see any reason to come to 
the farm. More details on this are discussed later in the chapter. The proportion of 
members interviewed thus ranged between 9% and 100% of the original members per 
project (Figure 4.1). Kopano has the highest percentage of active members (100%), 
followed by Ditaung with 76%. As already stated Boichoko had the lowest number, at 
just 8%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47
Figure 4.1 
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4.3.2.  Case studies of land redistribution projects in the Vaalharts Scheme 
 
This section provides brief descriptions of the surveyed projects, summarising 
information obtained from interviews of the projects’ beneficiaries, and interactions 
with PDA and NCPLRO officials and representatives of agricultural co-operatives 
and commercial farmers.  
 
4.3.2.1. Moso 
 
(a) Background information 
 
Plot No. 5A8, measuring 40.9763 hectares, was bought through LRAD in 2002 at a 
cost of R650 000 for 40 members. The land is registered in the name of a Trust, called 
Moso Trust. An executive committee has been elected, which is responsible for the 
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day to day running of the project, carrying out functions such as fund raising, making 
decisions on production and marketing of crops, and management of finances.  
 
According to the project’s business plan, farming is intended to be a group activity, 
and the arrangement was that all income would be paid into the trust’s bank account. 
The money was to cover production costs and the surplus, if any, was to be shared 
equally among the members who worked on the project. This is what the business 
plan prescribes. However, such benefits have never materialised as the income has 
never been enough to cover inputs costs or to pay back production loans (details of 
which are discussed later in the section).  
 
Members who are no longer active sometimes show up on the farm, but only when it 
suits them, for instance at harvest period with the expectation of a share of profits. 
According to the business plan all members shall have joint responsibilities, and 
benefit, and share the labour.  
 
“We realised that if we do not share labour equally amongst ourselves, others would 
be overworked and that is usually a recipe for friction. But, unfortunately our tension 
was caused by other factors that we did not really expect”, said Mr. Oganne.  
 
The CPA committee was accused of misappropriating the project’s money, which 
some members saw as the reason for not repaying the loan. This, according to 
members, has led to the destabilisation of the project and members losing interest in 
the project. Out of 40 members, only 10 are still active. Loss of interest by most 
beneficiaries could also be due to the fact that there were little prospects of generating 
an income and because of the accumulating debt and continuing inability to produce. 
 
(b) Land use 
 
The Moso project received a production loan of R200, 000 from ABSA in 2004, 
which was to be repaid over five years, for the establishment of wheat and lucerne 
crops. An agreement was reached with ABSA and SENWES Co-operative to supply 
production inputs as well as farm management support for the project. SENWES Co-
op was also to buy the produce from the farmers. In 2004, lucerne was established on 
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15 hectares, while 17 hectares was used for wheat, which is rotated with maize. An 
area of 8 hectares already had olive trees, which according to members were not 
bearing fruit any longer and it was therefore decided to take them out with the 
intention of expanding lucerne production. They assumed that the trees were old and 
that was the reason why they could not bear fruit. There was never an attempt though 
to verify if failure to fruit was due to the trees’ lifespan or if this was related to poor 
orchard management. The Department of Agriculture and Land Reform (2006) states 
that olive trees remain in production for centuries and alternate bearing occurs if trees 
are not properly managed.  
 
The expansion of lucerne did not materialise and the 8 hectares is currently not 
utilised (Fig. 4.2). Records from members show that 22 tons of lucerne was harvested 
in 2005 (an average of 1.46 tons per hectare) from the first cut. Subsequent cuts were 
not recorded anywhere. Although record keeping has been very inconsistent wheat 
and maize were recorded at 3 tons/ha and 2.6 tons/ha, respectively, with total yield of 
51 tons for wheat and 44 tons for maize during 2005/06 harvest. SENWES Co-
operative17 confirmed the figures for wheat and maize but not for lucerne, as they did 
not buy the lucerne and therefore had no records.  
 
According to Mr van der Merwe, a commercial farmer at Vaalharts, the average yield 
of maize and wheat on Vaalharts is 9 and 6 tons per hectare, respectively, with lucerne 
at 16 tons per hectare. Moso’s yields were clearly much lower than the average in the 
area. According to OABS (2006) the price of lucerne in 2005 was R600/ton for prime 
class, R500/ton for class 1, R400/ton for class 2 and R300/ton for class 3. The grade 
of Moso’s lucerne is not recorded anywhere. The assumption is that from 22 tons, at a 
minimum price of R300/ton, a gross income of R6, 600 was realised from lucerne. 
Maize and wheat prices for 2005/06 were R740/ton and R1 180/ton, respectively. The 
sale of 51 tons of wheat is estimated to have generated R60 180 and R32, 708 from 
the sale of 44 tons maize.  
 
                                                 
17 Meeting with Mr. Smit on 29 June 2006 
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SENWES prescribed levels of inputs they should use, particularly for maize and 
wheat, but the recommended amounts were not followed.  
 
“We were afraid that the costs to produce maize and wheat will be too high and we 
did not want to use all the money as we wanted to plant lucerne as well”, said Mrs 
Mochwaledi.  
 
“We were supposed to use the money to hire tractors and ploughs and harvesters also, 
and we had to see to it that the loan money that we received covers everything so that 
we do not have to go to the bank again”, added Mr Dire.  
It seems that the R200, 000 was stretched to include costs for the three crops, i.e. 
maize, wheat and lucerne, which obviously compromised on the recommended levels 
of inputs. This might have contributed to the lower than average yields of the area. It 
appears that the income generated (R99, 488) was used for other purposes, 
presumably consumption, instead of paying back the loan. This is shown by their 
inability to plant maize and wheat for 2005/06 and 2006/07 and the chances are that 
they might not be able to plant for the following seasons unless they get further 
assistance in grant form.  
 
Records for the harvest of lucerne for the 2006/07 season were not available. 
According to Mr. Mosiapula, they sold 15 tons of lucerne to Mr. Marais (who farms 
on the nearby farm and offered to cut and bale for free) for R270/ton, generating R4, 
050. He stated that because the lucerne was getting damaged on the land he wanted to 
put it to better use as a feedstock for his livestock.  
 
“The condition of the lucerne was deteriorating and I thought it is better to rescue it, 
but at the same time compensate the owners,” he said.  
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The amount received was very far from meeting their loan repayment of R43, 000 for 
2005. Interest on the debt accumulated and ABSA was, at the time of study, 
considering auctioning the farm to recover the money owed.  
 
The problem at this project is that after receiving the loan the assistance they got was 
not adequate to enable them to plan properly and apply correct production practices so 
that they were able to produce economically and profitably and be able to pay back 
the loan.  
 
It appears that failure to repay the loan and poor communication had created 
confusion and tension within the Trust, thus resulting in other members staying away 
from the project. 
 
Figure 4.2 
Land use at Moso
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4.3.2.2. Tswaraganang 
 
(a) Background information 
 
Tswaraganang Small Farmers bought portions 2, 4, & 6 of Plot No. B25 of Vaalharts 
Settlement B through SLAG in 2001, with 90 members. The size of the land is 84 
hectares. The project was registered in the name of Tswaraganang Small Farmers 
Trust and is managed by a Board of Trustees consisting of ten members, with a five-
member executive committee. Twelve of the 90 original members are currently active. 
Some of the intended beneficiaries only come in as workers during planting and 
harvesting periods and are not involved in day to day activities of the project.  Other 
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members are too old to work (age ranging from 76 to 97 years), while others have 
employment elsewhere. The business plan states that all 90 beneficiaries should be 
participating in the farming activities of the project, divided into four sub-groups, 
each headed by a member of the executive. The subgroups were supposed to be for: 
• Permanent crops (citrus, olives, pecan nuts) (30 beneficiaries) 
• Specialist crops (paprika, tomatoes, onion, potato) (30 beneficiaries) 
• Vegetables (butternut, cabbage, carrot) (20 beneficiaries) 
• Conventional crops (maize, wheat, groundnuts, cotton, lucerne) (10 
beneficiaries) 
 
The business plan further states that an implementation manager should be appointed 
at the infant stage of the project. The plan was never implemented and wheat, maize 
and lucerne were produced collective by 12 remaining members instead. The citrus 
that already existed on the farm was kept.  
 
It appears that failure to implement the business plan due to the lack of a clear 
implementation plan, and to lack of knowledge of the beneficiaries in how to do so. 
  
“This business plan was developed by some lawyers in Kimberley, Willem Strauss 
Attorneys and Conveyancers, and it was brought to us when the land was transferred 
and nobody explained it to us”, said Mr. Segopa.  
 
Moreover, as 35 of the 90 members were between 76 and 97 years of age, it was 
unrealistic to expect them to be actively involved in day to day activities of the farm, 
which are intensive in nature, as the business plan prescribes.   
 
Initially, 55 members were active, especially during the first year of production. But 
this changed when, after the maize and wheat seasons (2001/02), the project could not 
repay the Land Bank loan (see below). The executive committee was blamed for the 
project’s poor state of finance and many started drifting away from the project, 
probably because they lost hope and no longer saw possible income generation 
prospects from the project. As already stated only 12 were active at the time of study. 
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But, according Ms Gaoagwe, the loss was because returns were lower than production 
expenditure due to a drop in wheat and maize prices.  
 
“Our yield was not that bad, but we were knocked by low maize and wheat prices and 
our income was not enough to cover all the costs of production, that is why we could 
not repay the loan”, she attested.   
 
The situation resulted in most members not wanting to participate in activities of the 
project actively, and they eventually stopped attending meetings. Trustees on the other 
hand stopped calling general meetings and as a result most members were excluded 
and were uninformed of the developments on the project, including financial matters. 
Activities came to a stand-still for two consecutive seasons (2002/03 & 2003/04) as 
the project could not raise capital, and meanwhile interest accumulated on the debt. 
Mr Van Niekerk18 (a local commercial farmer and one-time mentor of the 
Tswaraganang small farmers) confirmed the situation, but also related the poor 
financial management to lack of skills on the part of the trustees.  
 
“Theirs was a problem of poor planning and cash flow management. They should not 
have doubled the costs by buying old implements and hiring some at the same time, 
because they ended up spending more and should have paid the loan instalment before 
they use the money for other things, repairs, for instance”, he asserted.  The situation 
later improved, following intervention by the PDA and FARM-Africa, which 
involved financial support, details of which are discussed in the next section. 
 
(b) Land use 
 
An area of 10 hectares is planted with citrus, 49 hectares with lucerne and 25 hectares 
are currently not utilised, but may be used to grow vegetables in the future (Fig 4.3). 
The project received a loan of R625, 000 from the Land Bank in 2001, which was for 
production inputs (R280, 000) and farming implements (R345, 000). The R280, 000 
loan was to be paid over five years, while the R345, 000 was for ten years. It appears 
that implements which were bought were not in a good working state, leaving them 
                                                 
18 Informal discussions after the meeting with Agri-Northern Cape on 15 June 2006   
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with no option but to hire some, thus increasing costs even higher. Irrigation is by a 
centre pivot, which was also in a poor state and needed constant repairs. It was 
ultimately replaced with money from CASP in 2005. The project has not been able to 
repay the loan within the agreed terms. 
 
The focus of the farmers at present is mainly on lucerne, which they say helps to 
generate income. Wheat and maize were the main crops before lucerne was 
established. In 2001/02 harvested quantities were a total of 55 tons of wheat and 40 
tons of maize, at 5.5 tons/ha and 4 tons/ha, respectively. This is estimated to have 
generated a total gross income of R97 280 from the 10 hectares that was planted. R66, 
000 of this was from wheat, which sold for R1, 261/ton. Maize generated a total of 
R31, 280 at R782/ton. According to the beneficiaries, production costs amounted to 
approximately R82, 210.  
 
“After consulting Mr. de Kock (the previous owner of the farm) for advice with 
regard to quantities of production inputs, which were estimated at R280, 000 (equal to 
the loan amount granted), we decided to save on costs and not use the whole loan 
amount, but put something aside for our19 wages throughout the season and for the 
repair of implements”, said Mr Sebego.  
 
He further stated that they did use the quantities of seeds, fertilisers and irrigation as 
recommended by Mr. de Kock, but had to cut on other inputs such as pesticides.  
 
“We were hoping that if the implements are back in good working conditions, we will 
certainly not need to hire for the coming seasons”, said Mr. Segopa. 
 
With production costs of R82, 210 and income of R97, 280, it is estimated that they 
had a net income of R8, 570, which, according to members was paid into the project’s 
account. 
 
There was no planting for 2002/03 and 2003/04 seasons and therefore no yield was 
recorded. The loan was not repaid for these two seasons. Repayment instalments 
                                                 
19 Wages for trustees and three more workers, who are also beneficiaries 
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escalated with interests, and members cannot remember exact amounts. According to 
members, the switch to lucerne was as a result of low prices relative to production 
costs of wheat and maize, which is not the only factor because their financial situation 
could also be attributed to other factors as already discussed. 
 
Lucerne was planted in 2004 with assistance from FARM-Africa (an NGO giving 
support to land reform beneficiaries). Initially FARM-Africa gave the project a grant 
of R175, 000 for the establishment of lucerne on 37 hectares, followed by another 
R30, 000 for the expansion of lucerne on 12 more hectares in January 200620. An 
average of 11 tons/ha were harvested with 2 cuts in the first year of harvest (2005), 
giving an estimated total of  
1, 617 tons. Their lucerne grade has not been recorded anywhere, but according to 
members their price ranged from R450/ton to R500/ton, depending on the condition of 
lucerne at the time of sale. According to lucerne grading system in OABS (2006), 
Tshwaraganang lucerne thus fell between Class 1 and 2 grades. This is estimated to 
have given them a minimum gross income of R242, 550 per cut from 49 hectares, and 
a total of R485, 100 from the two cuts in 2005. They spent approximately R90, 000 on 
mechanisation (hiring of lucerne cutter, rake and baler) per cut, totalling R180, 000. 
According to the Extension Officer, Mr. Gaobuse, the project at the time of study, was 
managing to pay R20, 000 monthly to the Land Bank as loan repayment, which 
amounts to R240, 000 per annum.  Lucerne thus generated a gross income of 
approximately R485, 100. Production and harvest costs are estimated R287, 359, with 
a net income of R177, 741 after loan repayment. 
 
Quantities of oranges harvested have never been recorded. It appears that the 
plantation was neglected for a long period and was never really considered for income 
generation. Costs for the revitalisation of the citrus and maintenance are estimated at 
R17, 500 per hectare per annum, totalling R175,000 per annum, with, if recommended 
levels of inputs are used,  an estimated gross income of R250,000.21 However, that 
was not the case and the income was only R15, 000 for 2005, from 2.15 tons (2 150 
bags of 10kg) at an average price of R7/bag. The money earned was paid into the trust 
account.  
                                                 
20 Discussions with Mr. Groeners of Farm Africa, 10 May 2006 
21 Tshwaraganang NIF calculations by the Department of Agriculture, December 2005 
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“We are currently focusing on lucerne production and we do not have enough time 
and money to start looking at the citrus, but we are planning to revive it as soon as we 
are able to manage our debt because the inputs (for citrus) will need extra funding”, 
said Mr. Segopa.  
 
The provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA) has given them funding under the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) during 2005/06, amounting 
to R300, 000. This money was used to buy a centre pivot irrigator, replacing the old 
one. CASP is a funding mechanism by the Department of Agriculture aimed to assist 
mainly beneficiaries of land reform for their production, marketing and training 
needs22.  
 
Figure 4.3 
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4.3.2.3. Boichoko  
 
(a) Background information 
 
The Farm Silverdale was bought in 1998 under the SLAG sub-programme for 185 
members, for an amount of R1.4 million. It measures 128.4796 hectares in extent.  
There was a balance of the grant, after the land purchase, which was used to buy 
implements that were already on the farm. The land was registered in the name of the 
Boichoko Communal Property Association (CPA) and the CPA elected an executive 
committee of 10 members to manage affairs of the project, for a term of 2 years. This 
                                                 
22 Department of Agriculture, www.nda.agric.za  
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Committee was re-elected for a second term in 2001, which ended in 2003. Elections 
for a new committee have not taken place since due to conflicts within the CPA, 
which has divided the CPA into two groups.  
 
The conflict was over the rental money from the lease of 94 ha by M. van Jaarsveld, 
of which details are discussed below. The previous committee is being accused of 
using the funds for their own personal use because the electricity and water accounts 
were not paid as agreed. Other members were in support of the committee, thus 
resulting in tension and division among beneficiaries.  
 
“Most of our people lost hope in the future of this project and stopped participating”, 
stated Mr. Siqoko.  
 
There was effectively no committee until 2006 when an interim one, comprising 10 
members, was put in place by the 18 beneficiaries who were still active.  
 
“We have decided to have this committee in place to guide our operations, although it 
is not recognised by the other group”, said Mrs Tawana.  
 
According to this group of 18, a constitution was developed under the leadership of 
the previous committee, but they do not have it in their possession. What they can 
remember from the constitution is that farming was supposed to be communal, with 
proceeds going into the project account; the executive committee was to be elected for 
a two year term and all members were supposed to contribute R50 monthly towards 
the project. They are not sure if there was ever a business plan.  
 
“Land Affairs should know as they were the facilitator of the project” remarked Mr. 
Ndaba.  
 
Attempts to get a copy from PLRO were not successful.  
 
Boichoko farmers did not have any capital to start farming and the CPA took a 
decision in 1999 to lease the land to a white commercial farmer with the aim of 
raising funds from rental. An area of 94 hectares was leased at R80 000/annum for 
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five years. The lease began in June 2000 and ended in May 2005. It was then renewed 
for another five years, until 2010, but instead of rent the lessee would now share profit 
on a 50/50 basis with the lessor (Boichoko CPA). The present (interim) committee 
does not agree with this arrangement and, according to Mr. Ndaba, they want to 
nullify it.  
 
“We have approached the Legal Aid Board to assist us with this matter because we 
were never consulted as the beneficiaries”, he asserted.  
 
By the time of the lease (2000) the farm had a water debt of R102, 000 owed to the 
Vaalharts Water User Association (VWUA). According to members, the debt was 
discovered after the farm was transferred, the point also confirmed by PLRO. There 
was also R31, 000 owed to Eskom for electricity, which is probably from irrigation 
related usage though beneficiaries seem not to know how it came about.  
 
“Lot of things went wrong here and we were too excited when we received the farm 
to take note of that. But, Land Affairs [responsible for the land transfer] should have 
picked up these things”, remarked Mr. Marks.  
 
The agreement with Mr. van Jaarsveld in 2000 was that he would, instead of paying 
the whole R80, 000 rental, rather pay R30, 000 directly to VWUA and R10, 000 to 
Eskom (towards debt payment) plus his current usage bills. He was to pay the other 
R40, 000 into the CPA account. This, however did not materialise as the lessee only 
paid R32, 000 into the CPA account in 2001 and no other payments were made ever 
since.  As already stated, the interim committee has begun a legal process to recover 
the outstanding rental money from the lessee and to get the new lease agreement 
nullified as they are not in agreement with its terms.  
 
(b) Land use 
 
As described above, 92 hectares of the farm are currently leased to a commercial 
farmer. Lucerne was established on another 15 hectares, under flood irrigation, in 
2005 by the group that is currently active on the farm, who are 18 in number.  The 
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remaining 21 hectares is currently not used (Fig. 4.4). Members are intending to use it 
for the expansion of lucerne and for vegetable production.  
 
The quantity of lucerne harvested was a total of 60 tons (4 tons/ha), from the first cut 
(the only one they have had so far). A gross income of R27, 000 was realised, at 
R450/ton. They expect to have the next cut during February/March 2007 with an 
estimated yield of 53 tons and R23, 850 gross income. The farmers attribute the likely 
lower yield to the fact that the crop did not get enough irrigation as the main pipes 
from the canal kept on bursting, thus disrupting irrigation during the growing season.  
 
“We are experiencing problems, the pipes are too old, and our wish is also to get the 
sprinklers because much water is wasted with this flood irrigation. These old pipes 
makes the problem even worse”, said Ms Mokopelwa.  
 
They did not use any fertiliser or pesticides. This implies that production costs were 
minimal, though not recorded anywhere, which also makes it difficult to determine 
whether production was profitable or was at a loss.  
 
“Even if we could have afforded fertilisers and sprays (pesticides) it could have been 
a waste because fertilisers need enough water and regular irrigation”, she added.  
 
Their market for lucerne is informal, to local livestock farmers. Their reason for 
choosing lucerne is because it is easy to market and does not get spoiled easily. They 
think wheat is more labour intensive and they might not afford costs associated with 
production of wheat. The project has never received any financial assistance. 
Members only receive technical advice from the Extension Services Unit of the PDA, 
although not enough according to the members. They expect the Extension Officer to 
visit them more frequently, at least two times a week as compared to twice a month at 
present, which might not be actually necessary given their current scale of operation. 
Beneficiaries possess some farming skills but lack farm management and financial 
skills. Some feel that their technical skills are not enough to enable them to farm 
better than they are doing presently, especially as they have intentions to expand their 
lucerne production. Assistance is also required to sort out the water and electricity 
 
 
 
 
 60
debt. Management and organisational problems with the CPA committee have to be 
addressed so that if external support is obtained it can be used effectively. 
  
Figure: 4.4. 
Land use at Boichoko
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4.3.2.4. Batsamaya Mmogo 
 
(a) Background information 
 
The Batsamaya Mmogo project started in 2004 with the purchase of 48.8035 hectares 
of land (on Plot 2GX1) for 45 members. The farm was bought for R780, 000 through 
LRAD and was registered in the name of Batsamaya Mmogo CPA and members are 
farming as a group. Only six out of 45 members are active. Some members have jobs 
elsewhere while others stopped coming to the farm because there has not been much 
activity due to lack of capital to start production. No business plan for the project 
could be located. According to the members, the land was intended to produce 
vegetables, wheat and maize. Produce would be sold and proceeds would go into the 
project’s account, which should have been in the name of the CPA, with CPA 
executive committee members as signatories but, because none of the committee 
members were still active, the account had still not been opened by August 2006.  
 
The few members who are currently involved have opened their own joint account in 
the name of Batsamaya Mmogo Small Farmers, which is outside the control of the 
official CPA committee.  
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“We have decided to open our own account after agreeing that we want to start with 
production and we had to start somewhere. Although we could not cover everything 
as inputs are expensive, we managed to plant 12 ha of lucerne from the R15, 000 that 
we raised”, said Mr Moleko.  
 
Members also attribute the lack of activity on the farm to a drainage problem that has 
affected a large portion of the farm (approximately 35 ha), with only 13 ha being 
cultivatable. This was confirmed by Mr. Venter, Extension Manager for the area, who 
attested that the farm is among those being surveyed to determine the extent of water 
logging, after which drainage has to be done, as part of the Vaalharts rehabilitation 
programme. As stated in the previous chapter Vaalharts rehabilitation programme is 
part of the initiative of the Department of Agriculture at national level to revitalise 
irrigation schemes in South Africa, aimed at promoting and improving efficiency in 
agricultural water use and increasing productivity of those schemes.  
According to Mr. Leburu, the Extension Officer has assisted them to draw up an 
application for CASP funding for 2007/08 financial year.  
 
“We have applied for CASP for next year and we hope that things will improve for 
the better, especially around water logging. Although CASP does not buy us inputs, 
the thought of knowing that the land is drainable will bring us relief”, he stated.  
 
They have applied for a grant of R1.4 million with which they plan to install a sub-
surface drainage system to address the drainage problem, as well as a centre pivot 
irrigator, a tractor and lucerne implements. They indicated that members who are not 
presently active are welcome to rejoin the group as long as they are able to match the 
financial contribution they have made thus far. This group of six is looking at the 
possibility of leasing the land from the CPA so that they can continue farming as a 
sub-group, but they are constrained by the fact that the executive committee has not 
met in a long time and no meetings, of the executive or an annual general meeting of 
the CPA, have been called where this proposal could be discussed.  
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(b) Land use 
 
An area of 12 hectares has been planted with lucerne, which is under flood irrigation 
and the rest of the farm is not used because of the drainage problem, as already stated 
(Fig.4.5). 
 
The R15, 000 contributed by members was used for production inputs and was 
augmented by R19, 420 (including 12% interest) credit they received from SENWES, 
which brought their total input costs to R27, 160. R17 340 was spent on seeds, at R1, 
445/ha R7 740 on diesel for planting and harvesting, broken down as follows: R2, 700 
(R225/ha) for planting and R5, 040 (R420/ha) for cutting and baling. The 
neighbouring commercial farmer assisted them with planting by using his tractor and 
implements for free, including cutting and baling of lucerne. They only paid for 
diesel. According to Mr Moleko, they opted not to use fertilisers, fearing that their 
costs would increase. According to recommended input levels their production costs 
would have increased by R17, 000 if fertilisers were included. 
 
“We decided not to use fertilisers because we did not want a bigger debt, hence we 
squeezed out costs to remain within the manageable amount. We know however, that 
fertilisers are important, but we thought we would rather buy them after our first sales, 
if the income is good”, he said.  
 
The first lucerne harvest was during October 2006. The yield was 61 tons (5 tons/ha), 
which they sold for R450/ton, a gross income of R27, 450. This was marginally above 
their total cost of production, a profit of just R290.  
 
“Although we were able to pay back the credit, the balance was still not enough to 
cover the next cut and baling and we still could not afford fertilisers. For the next year 
we will have to go back for another credit to supplement the R8, 000 that we have 
because we members feel another contribution will be a bit pressing on them. But, I 
told them that we need fertilisers to improve our yield so that our income could 
increase so that we are also able to expand the 12 hectares”, commented Mr Sethlabi.  
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This will obviously require them to borrow an amount that will cover fertilisers as 
well, possibly the same amount they previously borrowed. Considering the possibility 
of not getting the same assistance (implements) from the neighbour farmer they might 
be required to hire them. The total cost of production is likely to be in the order of 
R18, 144 including 12% interest, i.e. R7, 200 for cutting and baling and R17, 000 for 
fertilisers, with the assumption that they will still have the R8, 000 available.     
 
Figure 4.5 
Land use at Batsamaya Mmogo
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4.3.2.5. Kopano 
 
(b) Background information 
 
Plot No. 5R2 of Vaalharts Settlement A was bought in 2003 under the LRAD sub-
programme for 25 members for R366, 000. The size of the land is 23.3075 hectares. 
Implements were bought with the land for R118, 000. Land ownership is registered 
under Kopano Small Farmers Communal Property Association.  
 
The CPA has elected a committee to manage the farm on its behalf. According to 
DLA (2003)23 the farm will be managed in terms of the prescripts outlined in the CPA 
registration document. However, members interviewed did not have a copy of this 
document, but do have a CPA constitution which, they said, is governing the 
operations of the project. All 25 members are currently active. From observation, their 
high level of participation could be due to the fact that they had a balance of R83 500 
                                                 
23 Memorandum for approval of the LRAD application, June 2003. 
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of their grant left after purchase of the land, and that the farm was purchased with 
implements, thus making it possible for them to start production.  
 
Farming is carried out collectively with the arrangement that proceeds from sales of 
produce are paid into the project account, which should be used to “run the farm” 
according to Mr. Wesi, chairperson of the management committee. Implements 
however, wore out with time and some were at the time of study no longer 
functioning: namely a tractor, fertiliser spreader and lucerne implements (cutter & 
rake). This has put the project at a disadvantage because they are now compelled to 
hire, thus increasing production costs and creating other challenges, details of which 
are discussed in the next section.  
 
“When we purchased the farm with implements we were hopeful that we will save on 
hiring costs, which are high and the owner of the farm and Mr Deysel (Agricultural 
Engineer from the Department of Agriculture) assured us that the implements were in 
good working condition”, remarked Mr. Mokgele.  
 
It appears that because of this assurance members overlooked the fact that they 
should, despite the condition of the implements, have made provision for maintenance 
costs or even replacement costs.  
 
The farm is using flood irrigation method but received CASP funding in 2006/07 for a 
centre pivot irrigator, which has been installed. It is hoped that this will result in more 
efficient water use and reduce water logging, which is already showing on some parts 
of the farm. The change of irrigation method has also been recommended by 
Badenhorst (2002), stating that “the plot is well drained, but this could be maintained 
or improved for the better by a sprinkler system.”  
 
(b)Land use 
An area of 10 hectares was already planted with lucerne when the farm was bought in 
2003. When their production started during 2004/05 season (with first maize planting 
in December 2003), they rotated maize and wheat on the other 13 hectares (fig 4.6). In 
2005 they decided to replace maize and wheat and expanded lucerne to the 13 ha. 
Planting of the 13 ha was during April 2005. The decision to switch to Lucerne, 
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according to members, has been influenced by the fact that lucerne is easy to manage, 
coupled with the strong local demand, which guarantees them an income.  
 
“Our preference for lucerne is because we have seen from other local farmers, even 
commercial farmers, that lucerne does not require a lot of labour and it brings income 
more than once in a year. The fact that planting is once-off is an important cost 
saving, especially for us who still struggle to make ends meet”, remarked Ms Modise.  
 
By contrast, other common crops such as maize and wheat were considered more 
labour intensive and their sale prices are often lower than production costs.  
 
“Although we did not do badly on maize and wheat for 2004/05 season in terms of 
price received (about R88, 000 gross income) our fear was that the next season might 
not be the same as these prices keep on changing” she added. 
 
According to Mr. Venter (the Extension Manager of the area) quantities harvested for 
maize and wheat were 3 tons and 4 tons per hectare, respectively in 2004/05. The 
produce was all sold to the local co-operative (SENWES) for R1 100/ton for wheat 
and R810 for maize, with gross income of R88, 790. As with other projects, 
expenditure and income was not properly recorded. But according to Mr. Wesi, they 
could have spent around R60, 000, which they got from the balance of grant.  
 
“Land Affairs did not give this money directly, but paid SENWES for the supply of 
seeds, fertilisers, and sprays (pesticides)”, he explained. 
 
For lucerne, members reported that they had cut 200 bales, translated into a total of 10 
tons from 10ha by July 2006. All bales were sold to local stock farmers at R45/bale. 
Income received should thus be R9, 000. From discussions with members, it came out 
that no inputs, such as fertiliser dressings or pesticides were used on the 10ha, except 
for irrigation, which was also sporadic because according to Ms Molelekoa their focus 
was mainly on maize and wheat.  
 
“We had to concentrate on these two because we had to make sure that the money 
paid to SENWES gives us something in return”, she said.  
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She further stated that for the 13 ha of lucerne, they decided only to spend on seeds 
and fuel during planting, which was around R26, 000 (from the maize and wheat 
income).  
 
“Luckily, our tractor and plough could still work and we decided to leave out 
fertilisers because we could not afford them as Land Affairs could no longer pay for 
inputs because the balance of our grant was finished, and we had to hire a lucerne 
cutter, rake and baler for ours were not working properly. We also did not want to use 
all of our savings from maize and wheat income so that we can always have 
something for emergencies. Only  
R1, 500 (R37, 500 in total) was distributed to each member as an income (once-off) 
because we do not pay ourselves salaries”.  
 
Their next lucerne harvest was during September 2006. A total of 69 tons was 
harvested from the 23ha, which gave a gross income of R31, 051, from R400/ton, 
with net income of R5, 050, which was paid into the project’s account, according to 
Ms Molelekoa. 
 
As stated earlier, their implements have worn out over time. For 2004/05 season the 
project was already experiencing problems as most implements were no longer in a 
good working state, compelling them to hire, particularly a lucerne cutter, rake and 
baler. The problem was however addressed in late 2005 when the project received a 
tractor and other implements through CASP funding, to the value of R345, 000. Sub-
surface drainage was also put in to improve soil drainage.  
 
Another R800, 000 was allocated in 2006 for a centre pivot irrigator and water storage 
dam. FARM-Africa is currently running training a capacity building programme for 
land reform beneficiaries, which will also “address issues of records keeping and 
assist members to develop clear marketing plans24”. 
 
                                                 
24 Groeners, 10 May 2006. 
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Figure: 4.6. 
Land use at Kopano
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Compared to other projects Kopano has shown a high level of participation and 
commitment by beneficiaries, with the whole land under production. It is the only 
project that has 100% involvement of beneficiaries. It appears that availability of 
money for inputs enabled the project to start production immediately after land 
transfer and had created an environment where members had something to engage in, 
thus increasing cohesion.  
 
In addition, the fact that members decided to re-invest income they received from the 
first crop back into production and not use it for other things outside the project, 
might have reduced chances for conflicts, which could possibly have emanated from 
differing views on how the money should be spent, as was experienced at other 
projects.  
 
Furthermore, Kopano has positive signs for sustainability because of the management 
ability members have portrayed through good planning and effective utilisation of 
income earned. To the author, this is an indication that the project could sustain itself 
once the grants run out. Although the benefits, in terms of income that go into 
members’ pockets, may appear small at the moment, the indication is that they should 
increase over time with the sound management portrayed thus far, which could see 
improved livelihoods of the members.   
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4.3.2.6. Bonita Park Olives 
 
(a) Background information 
 
Bonita Park Olives started in 2005, with the purchase of 9.5881 hectares on Plot 6G14 
through LRAD. The project consists of 11 members, of whom only four are active. 
The land was purchased for R320 000 and, according to NCPLRO25, the title deed has 
not yet been formally transferred as the title deed number is still awaited from the 
Deeds Office. Nonetheless, Bonita Park Olives CPA was registered in 2005 as the 
entity to which the land will be transferred. The farm was already planted with olive 
trees at the time of purchase and according to members, was supposed to be managed 
collectively by all 11 members. Although the four members confirmed that the project 
had a business plan, they could not find it and attempts to get a copy from PLRO were 
not successful. According to Mr Visser (the owner of the olive pressing factory) the 
project has been targeted as one of the potential suppliers. His concern though is poor 
management of the orchard, which might delay the fruit bearing and result in fruit that 
are not of the required standard.  
 
“I’m concerned that those trees are not well taken care of and nobody seems to care 
anymore. Phokwane municipality was in the forefront of this project, but now 
everybody seems to have forgotten about it”, he said. “I think the department of 
agriculture has a critical role to play in terms of extension service and help 
beneficiaries sort out management issues as well”, he added.  
 
When the project started in 2005, all members received training through the National 
Development Agency, which was the only training they received.  
 
(b) Land use  
 
About eight hectares is planted with olive trees.  The other one hectare forms part of 
the boundary of the farm, which is rocky and not cultivatable (Fig. 4.7). The four 
active members complained of a lack of money and said all they can do is give the 
                                                 
25 Northern Cape data: Presentation to the LRCC on 16 November 2006 
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trees water, with no fertilisation or other inputs such as insect and disease control. 
There was not much happening on the land at the time of this study except for the 
tending of trees, which is done by the four active members. The four take turns, 
coming twice a week to water the trees and check if there are weeds, which they 
would then control. Those four think that other members lost interest because there is 
not much happening on the farm and were demoralised when they realise that there is 
no other means of income, at least for the next seven years.  
 
“We were supposed to be alternating in coming to irrigate and control weeds, but the 
rest seem no longer interested”, said Ms Motshabi.  
 
“It was out of our own choice to continue caring for the trees, though we are not 
coming everyday”, added Mr. Schalkwyk..  
 
It appears that they have other engagements elsewhere besides taking care of the trees. 
Their intention is eventually to lease the farm from the CPA so that “their current 
efforts could be justified and legalised”, according to Mr. van Wyk. “Although we are 
struggling now, we are still hopeful that there are business opportunities especially 
that this farm can supply the olive pressing factory.”  
 
For Ms Setlhabi, the lease can also provide security for their present efforts on the 
farm.  
 
“We know our people, they might come later and cause trouble, wanting to claim the 
benefits even though they were not here when we struggled”, she added.  
 
The trees are still at a growing stage. They were planted in 2004, immediately after 
the grants were approved, with the help of Phokwane municipality who provided 
funds to purchase the trees. The first harvest is expected only six or seven years after 
planting. It the probable that the main reason for their continued willingness to work 
on the project  without income is because the four are engaged in casual jobs 
elsewhere and are not necessarily dependent on the income from the project, which 
will only be realised in six to seven years time. Moreover, their commitment could, as 
already stated, be that they see a potential business opportunity in the olive project (as 
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suppliers to the olive pressing plant). It appears that the other members lost interest 
once they realised there would be no income until then and as a result were not 
motivated to continue working at the project.  
 
Figure: 4.7. 
 
Land use at Bonita Park Olives Project
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 4.3.2.7. Iphemeleng 
 
(a) Background information 
 
Plot 2G5 was bought through LRAD by 36 members of Iphemeleng group for R520 
000 in 2005. The size of the plot is 20 hectares. The land is registered in the name of 
Iphemeleng CPA. A six-member committee was elected upon registration of the CPA. 
Ten of the 36 members are still active, including the members of the committee. 
Those interviewed attribute lack of activity on the land to a poor state of irrigation 
infrastructure, and assume that this might be what made the rest of the members stay 
away, as not much could be done without proper irrigation.  
 
“We must first get the irrigation right before we can even think of money for planting. 
Most people could not just hang around here doing nothing, some were lucky to get 
“diskropo” (casual work) in town as there is nothing happening here”, remarked Ms 
Mocumi.  
 
She also confirmed that amongst the ten, most are receiving social grants as their ages 
range from 65 to 70 years. Attempts to get hold of the other 26 beneficiaries were not 
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successful. The ten had applied for CASP funding for 2007/08 financial to, amongst 
others, replace old pipes with new ones and to install a centre pivot irrigator.  
 
The project does not have a business plan. There is however a CPA constitution that 
was developed after the land was transferred. The constitution stipulates that the 
project will be administered by the executive committee, which shall hold office for 
two year. It further states that farming will be carried out collectively and sets out a 
code of conduct for members. The farm was under sprinkler irrigation, and old pipes 
and sprays could be observed lying around the field. According to the members, the 
irrigation system was in a rundown state when they came to occupy the farm. It 
appears that they could not engage in any activity before proper irrigation 
infrastructure is put up 
 
“We indicated to Land Affairs that all these pipes and sprinklers have to be replaced, 
and Mr Mojapelo (the former planner responsible for the area) promised that they will 
assist us, but up till now nothing has happened. We then went to see Mr Gaobuse (the 
local extension officer) after hearing from other projects that there is money from the 
Department of Agriculture and he helped us with the papers (CASP funding 
proposal)”, said Mr. Nosi. “The problem is that information does not reach us on time 
and we expect the extension officer to be informing us of all these (programmes), but 
he indicated that he is the only officer in this area (Phokwane municipality, which 
Vaalharts falls under) and he does not have enough time”, he added..    
 
(b) Land use 
 
The whole 20 hectares was lying fallow at the time of study and as already stated their 
production will only start once the irrigation is sorted out. The requested funds (R900, 
000) will be for the purchasing and installation of a centre pivot and building of a 
reservoir for water storage. The members’ intention is to plant lucerne because they 
heard from other projects that it is relatively cheap to produce and generates an 
income quickly.  
 
“We heard from other projects that lucerne does not need lot of money, and we are 
looking at approximately R3, 000. Hopefully, SENWES will give us credit for that 
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amount and we think we will be able to pay it back, if not we will contact the 
department of agriculture to help us, just for the first year”, said Mr. Sediti.  
 
Their estimation of R3, 000 for 20ha is however, far less than what “other projects” 
had spent, which was R25, 000 on average. As conditions vary from one project to 
another (for instance, others received assistance from farmer neighbours, therefore 
saving on certain costs) it would be difficult for Iphemeleng to base their costs on 
other projects’ expenditure. What they need is to get recommended levels of inputs, 
which they could use as the basis for their decisions.  
 
4.3.2.8. Ditaung 
 
(b) Background information 
 
Plot 1GX1, measuring 21.7 hectares, was bought through LRAD in 2004 for 21 
members. The farm was purchased for R400, 000 and it is registered in the name of 
Ditaung CPA. The executive committee was elected in 2005 to manage the farm on 
behalf of the CPA, with a committee of seven members. According to the chairperson, 
Mr. Latha, there was never a business plan on the application for land purchase, which 
was confirmed by Ms Booysen, the Planner from NCPLRO and farming is done 
jointly in a group. Only 16 members were interviewed as, according to the 
chairperson, Mr. Latha, others had commitments elsewhere.  
 
“All members are still involved, the five that are not here have other family 
commitments”, he stated.  
 
The project applied for R1. 3 million from CASP funding for 2007/08 financial year. 
The money is for water storage dam, a tractor, plough and lucerne implements (cutter 
and baler). Compared to other projects already discussed, there seemed to be no 
conflict among beneficiaries of Ditaung, which one member attribute it to the fact that 
they belong to related families and they know and understand each other’s strengths 
and weaknesses. They stated that they are contributing equally to the project by 
allocating specific tasks to each member, and according to their abilities.  
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“One cannot expect an older lady to do the same work as a younger lad would” said 
Mr. Latha.  
 
Their choice of lucerne is mainly because of the strong local demand. They do not 
struggle to sell it and in many instances people come to collect it on the farm.  
 
”Our only problem is that we do not have the necessary mechanical equipment, such 
as a tractor, cutter and baler, and we have to hire contractors to cut and bale, which is 
very expensive for us. We are spending approximately R6, 000 for hiring of 
implements”, added Mr. Segami.  
 
(b) Land use 
 
An area of 20 hectares was already planted with lucerne when the farm was bought, 
under flood irrigation (Fig. 4.8). They plan to replace 14 ha with wheat in 2007. 
According to the chairperson, the lucerne has reached its maturity period (after six 
years), hence the decision to plant wheat.  
 
“We will start with wheat on 14 ha and maize will be on the remaining six if funds 
allow us. Lucerne will then be re-planted on the whole 20ha during April/May 2009. 
The remaining 1.7 hectares on the farm is rocky and therefore not cultivatable”, he 
said.  
 
The farm uses flood irrigation and, according to Mr. Jantjie it is not possible to use a 
centre pivot irrigator because the land is V-shaped. In response to a widespread 
concern of water logging in the area, he pointed out that they have not experienced 
any problem yet.  
 
“We have not experienced water logging yet, but that does not mean we should relax 
because the chances are we might be affected as well, more so that we are on flood 
irrigation”, he added.  
Costs incurred to maintain the lucerne were not recorded anywhere. They have 
indicated though that to date they have only been irrigating, and had used herbicides 
once, early in 2006, when they tried to control broadleaf weeds. A total of 109 bales 
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(5.45 tons) of lucerne were produced from the first cut during November 2005, and 94 
bales (4.7 tons) from the second cut during May 2006, totalling 203 bales (10.15 tons) 
harvested by the time of study.  
This is estimated to have given a gross income of R9, 135, at R45/bale. Mr. 
Mocwana, the treasurer, estimated costs of approximately R6, 000 for hiring in cutting 
and baling equipment; R2, 756 was spent on herbicides, leaving a net income of 
approximately R379.  
 
Although Ditaung Small Farmers are not sure of the actual costs of all the inputs 
required for producing lucerne, they believe that by having their own implements they 
can save on hiring costs, thus increased net income. The next and probably the last 
harvest of the current lucerne crop is expected during January 2007.  
 
According to the CPA chairperson, the project has not received any financial support.  
 
“The only support that we are hoping for is from CASP, which we have applied for, 
but our challenge now is how to raise money for wheat and maize”, attested Mr. 
Latha. “We were hoping that the department would assist with money for these crops, 
which income we can then use for lucerne. We just don’t want to go into big debt 
(from borrowing) because we are not even sure if wheat and maize prices will be 
good”, he added.  
 
For Mrs Segami, training is also what they need. “We hear that people are attending 
courses, but it seems as if we were forgotten. What are we going to do if we get all 
these things (implements) that we have requested, but not knowing how to use them”, 
she said.     
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Figure 4.8 
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4.4. Summary of the findings and analysis 
 
This section gives a summary of findings and analyses the study results, drawing from 
the case studies.  
 
The study shows that crop income is generally less than production expenditure. This 
is attributed to factors such as low quality of produce. Proper production practices are 
not being followed, for instance, failure to apply recommended levels of inputs, which 
in turn reduces yields.  
 
Although records are not being kept on most projects, the available evidence suggests 
that yields are comparatively low, for instance lucerne yields on land reform projects 
are ranging from 11 tons/ha to 2.9 tons/ha per cutting (Tshwaraganang as highest and 
Moso the lowest).  
 
Lucerne was found to be the most common crop for new farmers in the Vaalharts 
scheme because the farmers see it as a crop that is easily managed. The strong local 
demand for lucerne has also made it possible for most projects to sell their crop, and 
some became profitable, e.g. Tshwaragang, thus making it the most preferred crop by 
emerging farmers at the Vaalharts scheme. Lucerne plantings cover 121 hectares (32 
%) of the total land redistributed, while maize and wheat crops account for just 8% or 
30 hectares. 18 hectares is used for citrus and olives (5%). The relatively small areas 
planted with maize and wheat can be attributed to low prices relative to costs, which 
recur seasonally.   
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As already stated, lucerne yields are extremely low compared to the average of 16 
tons/ha per cutting from white owned commercial farms. According to OABS (2006), 
lucerne is able to give nine harvests (cuttings) per year, and emerging farmers rely on 
it for cash flow. But, the findings of this study show that none of the projects had nine 
harvests, but only up to two harvests. From the price they have been selling at, their 
lucerne quality falls between the second and third grades. This is because with the 
sole exception of Tshwaraganang, none of the farmers did a proper financial planning, 
whereby production planning included recommended levels of inputs and at 
Tshwaraganang, that only happened after FARM-Africa’s intervention. This 
limitation saw farmers failing to use the necessary inputs, thus lower yields and lower 
grades were achieved.  
 
There is also a perception among beneficiaries that because of lucerne’s lifespan of 
five to six years, they do not need to apply fertilisers continuously during this period 
and as a result they view lucerne as a cheaper crop to produce than annual crops such 
as maize or wheat. However lucerne requires fertilisation throughout its lifespan. 
 
Poor financial management within the land reform projects was found to be a problem 
and has evidently resulted in an imbalance between what they put in and what they 
got out. In cases where projects managed to secure capital for production, deliberate 
decisions were made not to follow recommendations, but to use less so that the money 
could cover unplanned costs.  
 
Although new farmers do not spend much on inputs such as fertilisers and irrigation 
costs, considerable amounts go mainly to mechanisation costs, including hiring of 
implements. 
 
There is a common reluctance among land reform projects to take loans, for fear that 
they might not be able to pay them back, which might result in them losing the farms. 
This is because of experiences such as the threats of the land being auctioned at Moso 
and Tswaraganang.  
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Findings from the case studies show that beneficiaries of land reform projects in the 
Vaalharts scheme are struggling to get their new farms into production. The situation 
they find themselves in is definitely not conducive for them to achieve their hoped-for 
expectations, i.e. land ownership, which would enable them to generate income and 
become better off. This had led to most members losing interest and staying away 
from the projects. At the time of study only 101 out of 453 members were actively 
involved in the projects. The problem is that members who are no longer active did 
not relinquish their membership and might possibly return later when circumstances 
improve. This creates discomfort among those who have remained and the possibility 
of future conflict arising that could possibly cripple achievements already made.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
The settlement of black farmers in the Vaalharts scheme was intended to provide 
opportunities for black farmers to improve their livelihoods and play a meaningful 
part in the agricultural economy of South Africa. The results of this study, however, 
suggest that this is not happening.  
 
The study has found that the land reform programme at Vaalharts is not leading to an 
improvement of agricultural production, and that those land reform projects actually 
produce below average production in the Vaalharts scheme. Moreover, as is the case 
in Moso and Tswaraganang, some projects are now threatened with insolvency, due to 
an inability to recover costs incurred in agricultural production. Lack of necessary 
skills and conflict amongst members had resulted in the inability to service production 
loans.  
 
One of the purposes of land reform is to make beneficiaries better off in terms of 
livelihoods. In addition to maintaining productivity on the redistributed land, it is 
important that project members are able to improve their livelihoods from the farming 
activities they are engaged in. However this case studies analysis fails to show that 
this has been the case. Except for Kopano, no other project has ever reached the stage 
of having a disposal income, wherein members were able to share dividends from the 
returns realised. Tshwaraganang members even went to an extent of taking a portion 
of the production loan to share among themselves, which shows a sense of 
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desperation and emphasises the need for viable enterprises that can create livelihoods 
for farmers. 
  
Of great concern is the minimal support provided by the PDA to these projects. Even 
the support given was too little to make a difference (only two out of eight projects 
received assistance).  
 
There seems to be little effort from either the private sector or from civil society to 
support land reform projects in Vaalharts. FARM-Africa is the only NGO involved in 
post-settlement support.  
 
Collaboration between a range of stakeholders is necessary to provide an enabling 
environment for land reform farmers.  
 
The study has also shown that an underlying cause of the weakness of these land 
reform projects lies in the way they were designed. Poor project planning seems to be 
the root cause of the unfortunate situation in which the land reform farmers in this 
case study projects found themselves. The expectation that so many people could 
make a living from one farm previously owned and operated by just one commercial 
farmer or one family, had proven impractical and unrealistic.  
 
Redesigning these projects should be considered because even if the necessary 
resources are provided, institutional problems might still hinder the operations and 
management of the projects. Amongst other changes, the CPA’s institutional 
arrangements and terms of operations should allow the use of land by active members 
who have shown commitment.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 
This chapter discusses the argument presented in the thesis, giving a broader analysis 
of the land reform situation in the Vaalharts scheme. It draws out key conclusions and 
gives recommendations for the South African land reform programme. 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The study has looked at production on land reform projects in the Vaalharts Scheme, 
where most new farmers are failing either to produce or realise positive returns from 
their farming activities.  
 
The study commenced by giving a brief history of land distribution in South African 
prior to 1994 as it relates to the current land reform, highlighting some imbalances 
that existed in the South African society and that led to the dualistic nature of South 
African agriculture. It further gives a detailed history of land reform with reference to 
the international and regional experiences, highlighting also some theoretical and 
conceptual issues of land reform based on the work of various land reform scholars. 
The South African land reform programme is also discussed briefly, assessing its 
performance from 1994 to date; exploring challenges in general that face the 
programme and factors contributing to failing production on many land reform 
projects. This was done through a review of the emerging literature on land reform in 
the country (including grey literature) and a detailed case study of land reform 
projects in the Vaalharts irrigation scheme.  
 
Empirical analysis of production patterns of land reform projects in the Vaalharts 
scheme shows that production, where it is taking place, occurs under extremely 
difficult conditions. Except for Bonita Park Olives and Kopano, none of the farms had 
been fully planted since the transfer.  
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The study attempted to provide an understanding of current land use on the 
redistributed farms in the Vaalharts scheme; of factors that constrain new farmers and 
an assessment of the effectiveness of the existing post-transfer support interventions. 
Findings, conclusion and recommendations are drawn from this analysis. 
 
5.2. Analysis of the land reform situation at the Vaalharts scheme 
 
This section gives a broader analysis of how the situation of land reform projects in 
the Vaalharts scheme came about, looking at how the current problems were created 
and highlighting also key lessons emerging from the case studies.  
 
The study has shown that 30% of the redistributed land in Vaalharts has not been 
under production since transfer and that 45% is being used at a very low level. A 
project like Iphemeleng has never been on any production since the land was 
transferred in May 2005. Figure 5.9 gives the extent of land use on land reform 
projects in the Vaalharts scheme. 
 
Figure 5.9  
Extent of land use on LR projects at Vaalharts 
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Land redistribution in Vaalharts started in 1998 with the purchase of Silverdale Farm 
for Boichoko farmers; 11 years later, members are still struggling to get the land into 
production; 72% of the farm is leased to a commercial farmer for purposes of 
generating income.  
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Factors such as absence of support systems in terms of working capital and 
insufficient extension service, lack of skills and the poor state of irrigation 
infrastructure to a certain extent were found to be the main causes of general under 
production or no production on some projects. Flawed design and implementation of 
these projects also contributed largely to their poor performance.   
 
5.2.1. Extension support 
 
There is a general lack of effective support services to land reform projects at the 
Vaalharts scheme. Where support was being given, it was too little too late with lots 
of damage already done, for instance debts that were incurred and that cannot be 
serviced. In the case of Tshwaragang for example, a significant loan (R650, 000) was 
granted with no support measures put in place to see to it that production is planned in 
such a manner that returns are realized and that the loan is repaid. Moreover, the 
purchase of implements that were already worn out was tantamount to setting the 
Tshwaraganang farmers up for failure.  
 
The provincial Department of Agriculture became involved long after the 
beneficiaries had settled on the land, which made matter even worse. Before CASP, 
which is the main support that the Department of Agriculture is providing, the 
department’s support on these projects was non-existent.  
 
The case studies show that extension service of the Department of Agriculture is not 
visible on the majority of projects, and in instances where it is given, it is ad hoc, i.e. 
there are neither structured programmes nor clear plans of support for those projects. 
Participants in projects had to fend for themselves, and ended up in deeper debts, 
which are difficult to pay off, for instance in the cases of Tshwaraganang and Moso. 
The example of the plans by the Ditaung farmers to plant wheat, even though unsure 
whether this would be advisable, shows that extension advice is badly needed. They 
should have been assisted to explore possibilities of planting other crops, which could 
do well in terms of prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 82
The fact that there is only one extension officer in the Vaalharts area, who is also 
servicing other areas, confirms the PDA’s failure to provide the necessary level of 
support and this inadequate support has contributed towards the failure of the projects. 
As already noted, one of the reasons for the failure of projects to advance is the 
absence of extension support. Extension support is critical as the emerging farmers 
need to be advised what, when and how things should be done so that they can make 
informed decisions. The availability of resources (inputs and others) is fruitless if 
advice in how to use these properly is lacking. 
  
5.2.2. Working capital 
 
The unaffordability of inputs had also resulted in a situation where farmers cannot 
apply the required levels, leading to lower yields and poor quality produce.  
 
Lucerne is found to be the preferred crop at Vaalharts scheme, including the land 
reform farms, but the study has shown that yields on land reform farms are far below 
average for the area. This is because most projects do not use the required inputs such 
as fertilisers and pesticides, in particular26. There are cases where farmers choose not 
to follow what has been recommended because they wanted to remain within their 
budget. For instances, Moso decided not to follow the levels of inputs recommended 
by SENWES because they wanted to stretch the loan amount, for maize and wheat, to 
cover costs for lucerne as well. The study shows that lucerne is preferred over other 
crops such as maize, wheat and cotton mainly because it can be produced with 
minimal use of inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides, and does not require intensive 
irrigation. But such ‘savings’ come at a high cost, as both quality and quantity of 
yields is being severely compromised. As already stated in the previous chapter, the 
quality of lucerne from the land reform projects is mainly third grade.  
 
Although the recommended levels are derived for production under commercial 
farming practices, it is important that project members follow them as well so as to be 
able to achieve better yields in terms of quality and quantity. With better yields 
                                                 
26 OABS (2006) states that lucerne needs, for the first year of planting are as follows: Nitrogen, 
Phosphorus, Potassium and micro-elements of Cluco Zinc, of the following quantities: N (60kg/ha), P 
(44kg/ha),K (100kg/ha) and CZ (4kg/ha) and pesticides Cysure+ Iniboost (2l/ha) and Fusalate (1.2l/ha); 
the second to the sixth year is N(60kg/ha), P(44kg/ha),K(100kg/ha) and Alfalfa Pholate (4kg/ha). 
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projects members would realise a better income and in turn an improved livelihood, 
which has not yet been witnessed at Vaalharts scheme.  
  
Lack of capital also resulted in the complete absence of production on some farms as 
beneficiaries could not afford production inputs and the necessary implements, 
resulting in less activity on the farm.  
 
Most project members lost interest and stopped participating when the low levels and 
absence of production on the farms, showed no prospect of income generation or any 
other form of benefits. It therefore brought no financial benefit to their families who 
still had to be provided for, they left to find another source of income.  
 
As a result institutional arrangement for most projects are disrupted and affected, 
leading to conflict, because those few active members who are active are left to devise 
means to get production going. They are sometimes compelled to make unilateral 
decisions, which the absent members do not usually support. These conflicts had 
notably disrupted the relationships among project members, thus disturbing the social 
network that was created among themselves them as a farming community.  
 
With regard to implements, the case studies show that land reform projects do have 
access to what they need, but hiring is costly, thus contributing even more to lower 
returns. A few projects were awaiting CASP funding so that they can purchase the 
necessary implements. Proper financial planning is therefore of critical importance 
because they would need to include running costs, such as fuel and maintenance.  
 
Other costs that land reform projects seem to take lightly are for irrigation water.  As 
stated by Mr. Segopa (chairperson of Tswaraganang Trust), water costs might soon be 
a problem in future for many projects if costs are not included when planning is done. 
Most projects were still within the subsidised range as set by the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry at the time of study. The subsidy works as follows: new farmers 
pay no charge for the first year of farming; 20% of the standard irrigation charge in 
the second year; 40% in the third year; 60% in the fourth year; 80% in the fifth year 
and in the sixth and subsequent years emerging farmers pay 100% of the water 
charges paid by established commercial farmers (DWAF, 2004). This will obviously 
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increase their cost of production and could only be offset by substantial levels of 
productivity. 
 
Production inputs could be acquired through production loans, which are not 
necessarily a problem for land reform beneficiaries to acquire. The challenge 
however, is the widely held view among land reform beneficiaries in the Vaalharts 
scheme associating credit with a risk of land repossession. This is because of 
experiences from those projects that had difficulties in repaying the loans.  
 
5.2.3. Skills to farm productively and economically 
 
In each of the projects that were studied and which are in production, one of the main 
challenges facing new farmers were their limited farming skills. The case studies also 
indicate that very little training is offered to members of projects upon settlement on 
their new farms, particularly those at Vaalharts. They had to find their way through 
trial and error. On very few occasions would the previous owner of the farm, who had 
experience of the farm and knew what is required or needs to be done, be approached 
by new land owners for advice.  
 
Furthermore, participants in these land reform projects failed to keep records of their 
farming activities, because of lacking or limited appropriate skills, thus making farm 
management difficult. Records are essential for any business for the simple reason 
that the owner should be able to know whether the enterprise is profitable or running 
at a loss, and what areas within the business require intervention. None of the projects 
have proper farm record keeping systems and where these are kept, these are very 
inconsistent. Farmers need to have a fundamental understanding of profit and loss, 
and need to be able to understand why it is necessary to retain money from one 
harvest for use the following season and also why it is necessary to invest in the 
maintenance of implements.   
 
Skills are also critical to enable a farmer to do proper production planning and to 
understand those plans. The study shows that negative returns on most projects are as 
a result of failure to understand the significance of following recommended levels of 
inputs. Had these been followed, the yields and the quality of the crops might have 
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improved. For some, there was money from loans for production, but instead that 
money was spent on other costs that were not included, thus compromising the yield 
and quality of the planned crop. To make informed decisions, farmers need to be both 
knowledgeable and skilful, and have access to external support and advice.  
 
5.2.4. Irrigation infrastructure 
 
The poor state of irrigation infrastructure emerged as one of the main challenges with 
which land reform projects have to deal. In the case of Batsamaya Mmogo, this was 
found to be a limiting factor and led to the non-utilisation of much of the land. Most 
redistributed plots in the Vaalharts scheme initially used flood irrigation, but the 
infrastructure for this was generally run down and the farmers are moving to centre-
pivot irrigation, also with the aim of saving water compared to flood irrigation. Some 
projects have already received assistance from CASP funding in this regard 
(Tshwaraganang and Kopano) while others have applied and are waiting for an 
official response (Batsamaya Mmogo, Bonita Park, Iphemeleng and Ditaung). The use 
of a centre pivot system will, however, increase their overall production costs because 
of additional costs for. Electricity and maintenance, and it is critical that this is taken 
into consideration when production and financial planning is done.   
 
5.2.5. Project design 
 
The main problem observed in most of the projects originated in the project design, 
whereby the number of people who could benefit from a project took precedence over 
the feasibility and viability of that particular project, for instance 185 people at 
Boichoko on 128 ha of land without a clear business plan as to how they should 
operate. Project design and implementation did not take into account the number of 
members, in terms of how the production was to be organised within the group, or 
how the benefits were to be distributed.  
 
In instances, where business plans were developed, they were developed by outsiders 
without involvement of project members. As a result members were often unable to 
implement these, for instance at Tshwaragang members did not have a clear 
understanding of what they should do and members who were identified for certain 
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enterprises could not do so because of limitations, such as old age. In such instances, 
the projects opted for what was within their means and capability and ignored what 
was prescribed by the business plan. This is not necessarily wrong because, instead of 
trying to work on something that they could not understand, their decisions and 
actions were largely informed by the resources at their disposal and what was possible 
for them at that point in time. There is no point in carrying out a business plan if the 
implementers (project members) cannot make sense of it and it does not relate to their 
situation.  
 
Moreover, because of large numbers, members had no choice but to farm as a group 
on a small piece of land.  
 
The average land size of land reform projects at Vaalharts is 48.25 ha, and the average 
number of members on the land is 57, giving each member 0.95ha on average. Large 
numbers of project members is due to inappropriate planning, which in most instances 
had contributed to members losing interest and staying away from projects. 
 
Institutionally, ineffective management structures (e.g. CPA committees) have 
resulted in a lack of direction in most of the projects. Although in many instances a 
lack of activity on the farm contributed to members losing interest in the project, there 
is also an element of conflict among project members, in which committees were 
blamed for allegedly misusing project money, for failing to pay back loans (Moso) 
and for poor management of the project (Tshwaraganang).   
  
The committees are supposed to be democratically elected by CPA members to 
manage the affairs of the project on their behalf. These structures are expected to 
carry out administrative responsibilities, which include drawing up and managing 
budgets, keeping and managing records of the projects operations. Without the 
appropriate skills, it is difficult to operate these projects properly.  
 
It appears from the case studies that for most projects annual general meetings have 
not been arranged. The reasons being that there are very few active members, many 
have lost interest and would not bother to come to meetings. Another reason could be 
that the active few are too busy, struggling to make farming work to worry about 
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AGMs. Some members have indicated the need for these meetings so that certain 
decisions or proposals could be approved or sanctioned. The failure to hold AGMs 
means that committees can not be replaced, as elections never take place. This results 
in non- functional structures that impact on operations of the project because the 
active members will always have doubts regarding the legitimacy of their decisions in 
the absence of the majority of the membership.   
 
5.2.6. Effectiveness of support programmes and  services available to new farmers in 
the Vaalharts scheme 
 
This section analyses support programmes and other services, such as financing that 
are available to new farmers at the Vaalharts and its effectiveness. Support in this 
instance,  entails development assistance that is provided, subsidised or freely 
available, by government or NGOs, while services refer to services that are paid for, 
e.g. from credit providers or financial institutions.  
 
5.2.6.1. Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA) 
 
The PDA’s role in land reform is supposed to be to provide pre- and post-settlement 
support to land reform projects27. Pre-settlement support involves evaluation of the 
agricultural potential of the farms to be bought and in some instances development of 
business plans28. Post-settlement should include extension service, training and 
assistance with infrastructure development and advice on marketing of produce. 
However, the practice at present is far from the ideal.  
 
According to the findings of this study, the PDA support to new farmers in Vaalharts 
is limited to the development or upgrading of irrigation infrastructure and provision of 
tractors and implements through CASP and extension service to a lesser extent, which 
according the study has not been effective because of its ad hoc nature, as already 
noted. The PDA’s involvement began with the introduction of CASP in 2005, whose 
support had only reached three out of the eight projects at the time of the study.  
 
                                                 
27Strategic Plan of the Department of Agriculture and Land Reform, 2005-2010, DOALR. 
28Some business plans are outsourced using the planning grant, which is part of LRAD grant  
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The marketing of produce on the surveyed projects was also found to be an initiative 
by farmers themselves and because of the local demand (particularly for lucerne as 
their main crop) marketing did not seem to be a problem. However, PDA’s assistance 
should have been on improving yields and quality of produce. Training from PDA 
was found to be lacking, and where training took place it was only by FARM-Africa 
(on projects where it is involved) and by the National Development Agency which 
occurred once for Bonita Park Olives project. A widespread view among beneficiaries 
is that the extension service does not reach them. For instance in the case of 
Iphemeleng, members had to go to the Extension Office to seek assistance with the 
CASP application, after hearing about CASP from other projects.  
 
From discussions with project members it appeared that the preferred norm is for the 
Extension Officer to visit these projects twice weekly, especially where production is 
taking place, compared to twice a month, which is the case currently. 
 
5.2.6.2. FARM-Africa 
 
FARM-Africa has been giving support to land reform beneficiaries in the Northern 
Cape since 1998. The support initially was just for training and capacity building, 
mainly on land and resource management. The assistance has lately expanded to 
include some financial assistance, such as livestock banking and money for 
production inputs in some instances, for instance Tshwaraganang. It currently 
supports 35 projects throughout the Northern Cape but their only projects in the 
Vaalharts scheme are Tswaraganang and Kopano. According to Joseph (2005) the 
expansion of support to more land reform project, Vaalharts included, will obviously 
be determined by the availability of more funds, which would also increase capacity 
in terms of staff.       
 
FARM-Africa’s support appears to be making a difference in projects in which it is 
involved, for instance in Tshwaraganang and Kopano. The question though is whether 
the current progress could still be maintained after FARM-Africa’s exit, which could 
be the area for future research. According to Joseph, it is their plan to reach out to 
more projects, and it is what their proposal for funding (donor funding) always 
attempts to do.  
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5.2.6.3. Financial support and services 
 
Some of these projects, like Kopano, received grants from DLA (in the form of the 
balance of their LRAD grant); Tshwaraganang and Kopano were assisted by PDA 
through CASP, while Batsamaya Mmogo, Iphemeleng and Ditaung have applied for 
2007/08 funding.  Tshwaraganang also received R150 000 grant from FARM-Africa. 
Projects do not receive money from CASP or from the balance of LRAD grants, but 
obtain payment for services rendered and purchases are made on behalf of the 
projects. 
 
It was clear from discussions with members that most projects are not keen to 
approach banks for assistance out of fear that they may not be able to repay the loan, 
resulting in the their farms being put on auction and the subsequent loss of what they 
value most. As echoed by Gittinger (1982: 31) small farmers are not prepared to take 
risks that could involve losing what they see as a source of livelihood. A common 
view amongst project members is that the PDA should see to their financial 
assistance, whether directly (financial assistance) or indirectly (by paying for the 
services/equipment needed) until such time as they have generated sufficient capital to 
manage by themselves. As no time frame is suggested for such grant funding, it is 
possible that such support is expected to be there always. 
 
This raises a question around their readiness to be independent and operate 
economically without subsidisation. While grants should be provided to land reform 
beneficiaries, as a start-up for production, they are not supposed to be infinite and 
such projects should be sustainable. As stated in the CASP document29, CASP is a 
once-off grant. Although it has six pillars of support that it must provide, its 
implementation has so far failed to address all six pillars, attending mainly to 
infrastructure and ignoring the critical pillar of training and capacity building so 
important for the sustainability of the projects.              
 
With regard to financial services, most land reform projects in the Vaalharts scheme 
have not approached banks for credit, except Tshwaragang and Moso which were 
                                                 
29 Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme, www.nda.agric.za  
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funded by Land Bank and ABSA for production loans of R650, 000 and R200, 000, 
respectively. Neither of the two projects managed to service their loans because they 
have been producing at a loss. 
 
Access to credit from agricultural co-operatives to new farmers in Vaalharts has been 
minimal. By the time of this study, it was only SENWES Co-op that supplied inputs 
and assisted with the marketing of wheat and maize for Moso project. GWK is 
providing credit services to land reform projects in other parts of the province but not 
yet in Vaalharts. According to Borman30 they are planning to extend their services to 
Vaalharts’ new farmers in the near future.  
 
As evidenced from the case studies, a comprehensive package of support and services 
is greatly needed if the redistributed farms are to get into real production. Given the 
availability and potential for other role players it would be unreasonable for the state 
to pay for everything as project members seem to be demanding, for instance the 
expectation of Ditaung farmers, who will soon be getting a tractor and implements 
from CASP funding, but feel that they might not be able to start production because 
they still need inputs, looking at PDA to provide for that as well. This might create 
over-dependence, where farmers will never see themselves ready to face the 
challenges of the liberalised economy, of which agriculture is part. 
  
If the state could provide basic support such as farming infrastructure, equipment and 
the provision of skills training, farmers should be able to solicit production inputs 
through other means, e.g. credit or even some form of grants from other role players 
in the private sector. If the state were to assist it should only be for the first cycle of 
production, which must be planned properly in terms of production and market for the 
produce. It must be clearly understood that the income gained from this must be used 
for the next cycle. This would require skills along with proper extension support for 
advice and guidance, which can be complemented with support from private 
institutions, most of which are already involved as the case studies have shown.  
 
                                                 
30 Meeting between GWK and the Department of Agriculture and Land Reform, 5 June 2006  
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Of critical importance though is commitment and willingness to make projects work 
from the farmers, in this instance, project members, so that all the support that is 
given becomes fruitful and is able to make a difference to their livelihood. Farming, 
like other business endeavours, requires people who can see the business opportunity, 
who are willing to take and manage the accompanying risks and who are ready to 
acquire the needed resources, skills and knowledge to ensure the successful operation 
of the farm as a business venture. This inherent characteristic has not yet been found 
in most land reform farmers. 
 
There is a need also for the new land reform farmers to understand that farming like 
any other business venture is risky and that knowledge and skills are the main tools 
for survival, not necessarily money alone, hence the need to build their capacity.  
 
5.2.7. Views of other role players on the performance of land reform projects in the 
Vaalharts scheme 
 
This study involved interactions with various role players, as discussed above. They 
included commercial farmers, agricultural co-operatives, banks and NGO such as 
FARM-Africa. Such interactions were intended to establish the views of role players, 
other than the intended beneficiaries of land reform in Vaalharts, to establish what 
could be constraining land reform projects from realising optimum production.  
 
A widely shared perspectives among those interviewed is that land reform fails to 
achieve its objectives because of poor co-ordination within and between government 
departments. Ideally the departments should ensure that land transfer to the new 
farmers is followed up with the necessary support. Planning between DLA and PDA 
for instance, has never integrated nor aligned. As a result there is always a gap 
between land purchase and post- transfer support.  
 
Commercial farmers made the point that there is a general misconception common 
among intended beneficiaries that farming is a quick and easy money-making venture. 
This often results in insufficient and inappropriate planning.  
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According to Mr. van der Merwe (Agri Northern Cape chairman in Vaalharts) “people 
tend to ignore some of the risks associated with farming, such as natural disasters and 
prices volatility. These are the main factors that usually break farmers, as the farmers 
would get less than what they expected. The result is low or in some instances no 
profit at all”.  
 
He argued that all these factors should be taken into account when production is 
planned. This has not been the case with many land reform projects because of the 
constraints they are faced with as already discussed in previous sections.  
 
This opinion was echoed by representatives of the commercial banks, who also 
emphasised the challenge of keeping records of farming operations. For Mr. 
Symington31 (Agri-business manager at Standard Bank), keeping of records is critical 
for any business venture so that the owner should be able to know whether the 
business is making a profit or is operating at a loss.  
 
“This is also important information that is looked at when a loan has to be granted”, 
he said.  
 
From FARM-Africa’s point of view, lack of skills in land use management, along 
with lack of production inputs and the necessary tools or implements, are the main 
factors that lead to failure or under-performance of projects.  
 
The problem of excessive numbers of members in projects was also raised. In the 
opinion of Mr. Moller (President of Agri Northern Cape), projects that have large 
numbers of members should have a qualified farm manager to would work with 
selected members on specific tasks.  
 
“This will also ensure a clear division of labour and responsibilities, thus minimising 
tensions”.  
 
                                                 
31 Discussion of 3 August 2006, at provincial female farmer of the year awards in Colesburg 
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The success of this will be dependent on the availability of financial resources and a 
feasible business plan. The farm manager should also be there to transfer skills to 
members to prepare them to take over management at some point.   
 
For SENWES, another factor is the limited potential of the land relative to the number 
of intended beneficiaries per project, which is often not taken into account when land 
is redistributed. It should be evident that most members are unlikely to obtain benefits 
from the project.  
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
1. The success of land reform in South Africa is highly dependent on sound pre- and 
post- transfer planning that will see sustainable utilisation of the land after 
transfer.  
From several statements and comments made by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Land Affairs32 and officials within the Ministry of Land Affairs33 it is evident that 
the land reform process in South Africa is beginning to make new moves towards 
meeting the target of having 30% of productive agricultural land in the hands of 
blacks by 2015, though this is still on paper and has not yet been realised. This 
could be viewed as an implicit acknowledgement of criticism and pressure from 
all quarters that land reform in South Africa is proceeding at a snail’s pace and 
ought to be fast-tracked. Of concern though is whether post-transfer support 
services will be able to catch up if this fast-tracking materialises.  
 
2. Support takes too long to realise and most transferred land takes years to come 
into production, and even then is at a very low level. Plans to fast track land 
reform should therefore proceed along with plans to fast track post-transfer 
support so that the existing gap does not grow bigger. There is already a backlog 
of support services on the transferred land and this study has shown how the 
majority of land reform beneficiaries are struggling to make ends meet and are left 
                                                 
32 Key message from the Minister’s media briefing, 7 September 2006, www.dla.gov.za  
33 “Gwanya reveals new land acquisition plans” Farmer’s Weekly, 8 September 2006, page 14.  Refer also to 
comments by Mr. Thomas, Land Affairs Director General, City Press, 11 February 2007, page 11 
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to survive on their own. Hence, it is critical that measures are put in place for 
immediate support after transfer.  
 
3. The question of the intended farmer’s livelihood has not been taken into 
consideration when projects were planned. To the new owners/ beneficiaries, it is 
of primary importance that the farm generates economic profits which they can 
share. 
  
4. A widespread view among land reform and development activists is that land 
reform alone will not address the inequalities in mainstream agriculture in terms 
of access and participation by previously marginalised groups. Land reform 
should therefore be embedded within a broader economic reform, where other 
necessary resources, such as production inputs and relevant skills are made 
available. 
  
5. Production on these land reform projects is not sustainable because of lack of 
money for inputs. In instances where returns are realised, from the previous crop 
for example, they are often low and are used for other purposes, such as 
consumption, instead of being invested back into the farm for the next season’s 
production.  
 
6. Along with the necessary inputs should be the improvement of farming skills and 
know-how for new land owners, which is critical to their farming practices and the 
management of their farms. This has not been the case for many land reform cases 
in South Africa. Vaughan and McIntosh (1993), discussing the importance of 
farming skills in agricultural commercialisation holds a view that: “… with most 
commercial crops, it is necessary for traditional farmers to unlearn their previous 
farming practices before they can become successful farmers.” 
 
7. PDA’s involvement in providing support to land reform farmers was found to be 
lacking. It was supposed to be through extension service that farmers’ training 
needs were identified and production planning done to assist new land owners to 
understand their farming requirements better so as to be able to farm properly.  
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8. A market exists for crops such as lucerne, which land reform farmers are in a 
position to produce, and this should serve as the basis for proper production 
planning, together with good farming practices. 
 
9. Projects are under pressure to redistribute income among members, and repayment 
of loans is not prioritised. Equally, financial and farm management skills are 
lacking, implying that projects will continue to run at a loss.  
 
10. In some cases project members have resorted to leasing the land to interested 
white commercial farmers in order to raise capital. However evidence from the 
case study shows that, if not handled with the necessary expertise, especially on 
the part of project members as lessor, leasing the land might not necessarily 
achieve what was intended for, but get members into unnecessary legal battles 
with which they might not be able to deal. The other challenge is that renting 
might be indefinite, project members regarding it as source of income and they 
might end up not wanting to get into their own production.   
 
11. LRAD is intended for commercial production, but the commercial aspect 
especially in the study area has not been realised. This shows that as long as the 
design of LRAD projects remains unchanged, the commercial intentions of this 
sub-programme of land reform might never be accomplished. It had become clear 
that the "large group" projects that characterised SLAG was not the appropriate 
land delivery mechanism, hence the replacement of SLAG with LRAD. It 
however appears that the same SLAG approaches are still embedded in the 
LRAD.  
 
12. The current grant scale of R100, 000 maximum grant per individual compels 
applicants to group together in order to meet the land purchase price, otherwise 
they will not afford to buy the land, especially if they cannot secure the loan from 
the Land Bank and complement the grant to make up the price. As already 
discussed the loan later becomes a burden because projects often find repayment 
difficult. The inference is that land value and prices were never taken into account 
when the grant scale was developed. A review of the scale is warranted to make 
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the land affordable and to address the issue of too many members acquiring a 
small piece of land. 
 
Land reform in South Africa is considered to be among the key national development 
strategies aimed at reducing rural inequality, improving food security and livelihoods 
and overall welfare of rural population.  
 
This study concludes that the land reform farms in the Vaalharts scheme have not 
realised their agricultural potential.  
• The farms are making very little contribution towards the livelihoods of the 
intended beneficiaries.  
• The expectations of the state that these new farmers will contribute to the 
mainstream agricultural economy are not being met.  
• Without immediate and comprehensive interventions the objectives of 
transforming the agriculture sector and improving rural livelihoods through land 
reform are unlikely to be realised and the status quo of dualistic agricultural sector 
will remain, thus perpetuating rural poverty and unemployment, which is 
estimated at R3.2 million Africans and Coloureds34 
 
5.4. Recommendations 
 
The main recommendation from this study is that land transfer to black emerging 
farmers for purposes of land reform should be done in conjunction with a complete 
support package that includes capital for production inputs and marketing costs; 
training to develop and improve farming skills; relevant technology transfer through 
extension service and market for the produce. Many land reform beneficiaries have 
never farmed before and getting them into farming without the necessary resources is 
setting them up for failure. 
 
To make land reform projects realise their agricultural potential, the following support 
systems are necessary, not only at Vaalharts scheme but also elsewhere in South 
Africa as well: 
                                                 
34Michael Aliber (2003), Testimony before the TCOE Tribunal, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)  
 
 
 
 
 97
 
5.4.1. Aligning land transfer with required support 
 
Any land reform project that is approved should immediately receive post-transfer 
support, which is comprehensive enough to get them into production. Looking at the 
few projects in this study where support has been given, it has been inadequate and 
for that reason farmers could still not farm effectively after receiving production 
loans. There was still a need for training to ensure that those inputs are efficiently 
utilised, which should have been provided by PDA.  
 
The situation has also been difficult for other stakeholders, such as NGOs, in that in 
instances where capacity building is offered by NGOs, either the infrastructure is not 
up to scratch or implements are lacking, as was the case at Tshwaraganang and 
Kopano where FARM-Africa is involved. 
 
The time elapsed between the land transfer and provision of support is also 
unacceptably long. PDA support to all projects that were studied, came very late, and 
only after the introduction of the CASP grant in 2004, and extension services were 
still lacking. For some projects, like Moso and Tshwaraganang, support came four 
years after transfer and for Boichoko, eleven years after transfer there is still no 
support, resulting in an unfortunate legal battle between project members and the 
lessee over unpaid rent, which they had hoped would contribute towards resolution of 
their financial problems.  
 
This clearly shows that a disjuncture exists between the departments of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs. To address this, there must be integrated planning that will see the 
two departments synchronising budgets and activities so that projects that are 
approved by PLRO are also budgeted for by PDAs through CASP grant funding or 
other sources, such as Food Security fund, in the case of Northern Cape PDA.  
 
Nationally, CASP is the only funding programme thus far that is specifically aimed at 
supporting land reform projects. Currently planning and allocation of CASP money is 
done a year preceding the funding and for projects that were transferred either during 
the year of planning or in previous years. This implies that projects that are approved 
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during the year of CASP implementation can only be funded a year or more after the 
transfer and not all of them can get funding due to budgetary limitations.  
 
The study therefore recommends the review of CASP planning and disbursement that 
will see CASP money available throughout the year so that projects that need funding 
do not have to wait too long. Delays have resulted in lands lying fallow and project 
members losing interest in their projects. The Department of Agriculture should 
therefore start a process of negotiations with the National Treasury as early as 
possible.   
 
5.4.2. Developing farming skills for land reform beneficiaries 
 
Farming, like any other business venture requires particular skills to be successful. 
The findings of this study show that access to production inputs alone is not enough to 
make a success out of farming. Most land reform farmers at the Vaalharts scheme 
have not received any training, either technical or managerial, that could have enabled 
them to manage their farms.  
 
As a recommendation for PDA, training for land reform projects must be developed to 
meet specific needs for specific farmers, in other words it must be enterprise specific. 
For instance, training for land reform farmers in the Vaalharts scheme should be on 
lucerne, which is their main crop. This should be complemented by continuous 
extension support for technical and business advice.  
 
The training should also designed in such a manner that it is hands-on and with follow 
up sessions on site (on the field) to ensure that farmers are able to implement what 
they have learned. The fact that the literacy level of the majority of land beneficiaries 
is low makes practical on-the-field training more vital.    
 
As part of a turn around strategy for projects that have a commercial focus, such as 
Tshwaraganang, Boichoko and Moso in the Vaalharts scheme, PLRO and PDA 
should consider revising these projects’ institutional arrangement. The arrangement 
could be that a small team of beneficiaries, obviously the ones that are currently 
active, be allowed to lease the land from the CPA so that their current activities on the 
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land could be formalised and legalised because the study has proven that if the rest 
decide to return to the project, it will be difficult for them all to get involved in 
farming at the same time. The other option could be de-registration of members that 
are no longer participating. This will not only guarantee security of the active ones (in 
terms of land ownership and earnings generated from the farms), but also make 
capacity building much easier and more focused.  
 
5.4.3. Support for credit management 
 
This study has shown that access to credit by land reform beneficiaries in the 
Vaalharts scheme is not a constraint, but the problem is how that credit is managed.  
 
As evidenced from the case studies, failure to repay loans was due to poor production, 
compounded by poor financial planning and management on the part of project 
members. It is therefore crucial that, over and above skills training for day to day 
management of the farm, especially where credit is involved, creditors or lenders 
should assist land reform farmers with risk mitigation strategies. This should include 
prudent production and financial planning to minimise financial risks. The farmers 
must understand the importance of this and learn to follow the recommended plans. 
After receiving loans, projects were left to fend on their own and the only time when 
contact was made with the bank was when repayments have failed and interest 
accumulated. Creditors/lenders must keep constant contact with the farmers for 
possible early warning signs. 
 
Of critical importance for financiers as well is that financing must not be in excess of 
the farming operations’ ability to repay the credit, as it has been the case with some of 
the projects in this case study. The projects were granted loans without really 
checking and without confirmation that they had the capacity to repay. It appears that 
the decision to grant such amounts was informed by the value of the collateral - which 
is the land and fixed assets - rather than on the track record or ability to repay of the 
farmers concerned. 
 
The Government’s MAFISA (micro credit) programme has also not yielded fruitful 
results at Vaalharts. Although a report from a pilot study conducted in Limpopo, 
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KwaZulu Natal and Eastern Cape provinces is still awaited35, preliminary findings 
indicate the failure of the programme to meet emerging farmers’ credit needs, 
especially the 8% interest rate, which many feels is too high for emerging farmers to 
manage as well as the credit limit of  
R100, 000, which is often inadequate to purchase essential equipment and 
implements. If MAFISA was designed with emerging farmers in mind, its products 
should be designed to meet the needs and requirements of the targeted beneficiaries. 
Addressing these concerns could possibly change the attitude of land reform farmers 
in Vaalharts towards taking production loan.   
 
5.4.4. Increasing extension capacity 
 
Although the study shows a certain degree of involvement and assistance to land 
reform beneficiaries in the Vaalharts scheme (e.g. in preparation of business plans as 
part of applications for CASP funding), very little is done in term of after care 
support. Traditional extension support, in terms of advice and technology transfer to 
ensure good farming practices and to ensure that a return on investment is realised is 
the most critical service that can be supplied to new farmers. As already stated most 
farmers do not have much farm management capability. This calls for carefully 
planned and clearly focused post-settlement programmes led by PDA.  
 
As projects are not homogeneous each project must have its own extension 
programme to meets its specific requirements. To achieve this, PDA should consider 
increasing the current capacity of extension service, not only in the Vaalharts area, but 
throughout the province. There is at present one Extension Officer who is responsible 
for Phokwane local municipality, under which Vaalharts area falls, who services 1 
581 emerging farmers. Although support is also given to the 1 045 commercial 
farmers, it is very minimal because most commercial farmers are resource sufficient 
as compared to emerging farmers and the main official focus is, in theory, on 
emerging farmers.  
 
                                                 
35 MAFISA progress report, presentation by D. Kekana, 5 December 2006, Kopanong Conference Centre   
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Considering the intensity of agricultural activities in the Vaalharts scheme there 
should be at least one Extension Officer assigned for that area alone. Collaboration 
between extension officers and other role players involved in agricultural 
development could also assist in terms of complementing one another with regard to 
knowledge and information to the benefit to farmers. Considering the rapid change of 
technology, it would be appropriate that Extension Officers are also capacitated 
through advanced training courses so that they are able to keep up with new 
technologies, and are able to advise on appropriate services. Specialist training for 
Extension Officers on the specific needs of first-time farmers would also be 
appropriate. 
 
5.4.5. Addressing excessive numbers of members within land reform projects  
 
Land reform projects in South Africa are characterised by large numbers of 
beneficiaries because of the way the land reform programme has been designed, 
particularly the size of grants relative to the size of the parcels of land that come onto 
the market. These big numbers have in many instances made management of projects 
difficult and frustrating for those management structures that are elected to manage 
and administer the affairs of the projects. Negative group dynamics are contributing to 
the non-sustainability of many projects.   
 
For the redistribution programme, on which this study is based, it is recommended 
that DLA considers the increase of the LRAD grant. Because people must pool their 
grants in order to acquire a property, the market value of a farm effectively determines 
how many people will settle on the land; not the number of people that the land can 
support. The current maximum grant of R100, 000 has proven insufficient for 
individuals or small groups to make up the purchase price. For those who are 
ineligible to augment this with Land Bank loans, the only option left is to club 
together with a large number of people so as to acquire a sizeable grant to enable them 
to cover the purchase price. The problem is that that not everyone in these big groups 
has equal commitment and interest in the project. This gives rise to conflicting ideas 
and interests among new land owners. The result is unsustainable and unmanageable 
projects that struggle to ensure equal (or any) input from all members and benefits (if 
any) which must be spread very thinly. It is not surprising that many intended 
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beneficiaries quickly lose interest as they see little prospects for income generation 
through their participation.  
 
It is evident from the study that the design of land reform projects, LRAD and SLAG 
in particular, has contributed to the failure of these projects. This warrants a change, 
which as already stated, should start with the LRAD grant scale, but should also 
include the size of groups and the organisation of production, whether along 
individual or collective lines, and whether for household food production or for the 
market.  
 
In light of this, the study recommends that further research should be conducted to 
determine a minimum sustainable size for a farm and this measure could be applied to 
determine the maximum number of people that should be settled on that land. The 
research should also determine what kind of income would attract farmers to farm 
sustainably on land which is given to them and what size farm would offer this, taking 
into account agro-ecological areas and farming practices.  
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